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A Clash at the Bedside: Patient Autonomy




On June 25, 1990, as the United States Supreme Court handed down
its first "right to die" decision,' a family crisis was developing in a Min-
neapolis hospital for which the newly proclaimed high court principles
would prove obsolete. In the summer of 1990, Helga Wanglie, aged
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1. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (Rehnquist, C.J.).
Cruzan focused on the request of the parents of Nancy Cruzan, a young woman in a persistent
vegetative state, to withdraw their daughter's feeding tube after it became apparent she had
virtually no chance of recovering her cognitive faculties. Writing for the majority, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist acknowledged that the questions presented by the case were ones of first im-
pression for the Court. He wrote: "This is the first case in which we have been squarely
presented with the issue of whether the United States Constitution grants what is in common
parlance referred to as a 'right to die."' Id at 277. In answering this question, Justice Rehn-
quist acknowledged prior high court decisions that held a competent person has a constitution-
ally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment, including nutrition and
hydration. Id at 278-80. But as to the rights of incompetent patients, such as Nancy Cruzan,
the Court deferred to the Cruzans' home state policy that requires clear and convincing evi-
dence of what the patient's wishes would be when a guardian seeks to discontinue life-sus-
taing treatment. Id at 284.
The Cruzan decision spawned numerous articles and commentaries, many of which refer
to the decision as a "right to die" case. See, ag., Jean N. Knouse, Cruzan: The Supreme Court
and the Right to Die, 36 Loy. L. REV. 1111 (1991); Elizabeth D. McLean, Living Will Statutes
In Light of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health: Ensuring That A Patient's
Wishes Will Prevail, 40 EMORY L.J. 1305 (1991); Martha Minow, The Role of Families in
Medical Decisions, 1991 UTAH L. Rnv. 1. Cf Leon R. Kass, A Right to Exit?, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 44 (arguing the Cruzan court did not set out a generalized
constitutional right to die).
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eighty-five, 2 was diagnosed to be in a persistent vegetative state,3 unable
to breathe or eat on her own.4 Mrs. Wanglie's biological existence was
maintained by mechanical support; a respirator sustained her breathing
and a tube supplied her nutrition.5 In the ensuing months, Mrs. Wan-
glie's physicians came to believe that because of her extraordinarily poor
prognosis, the aggressive care she was receiving was of no medical benefit
to her and should be discontinued. 6 Specifically, the health care team
responsible for Mrs. Wanglie's care felt that continued use of the respira-
tor and other forms of life-sustaining treatment7 was "inappropriate
medical treatment" that was "no longer serving the patient's personal
medical interest."'8
Mrs. Wanglie's family, particularly Oliver Wanglie, her husband of
53 years, vehemently disagreed with the hospital's recommendation that
care be terminated. 9 In fact, the Wanglie family insisted all treatment be
continued.' 0 Numerous conferences were held to resolve this fundamen-
2. Helga Wanglie was born on October 20, 1904. See In re Conservatorship of Wanglie,
No. PX-91-283, at 8 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Prob. Div. July 1, 1991) (order appointing guardian).
3. For a discussion of the characteristics, diagnosis, and prognosis of patients in persis-
tent vegetative state (PVS), see Ronald E. Cranford, The Persistent Vegetative State: The Med-
ical Reality (Getting the Facts Straight), HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb.-Mar. 1988, at 27, 28
(describing patients in PVS as "completely ... [and] permanently unconscious").
4. Mrs. Wanglie's lapse into permanent unconsciousness began on December 14, 1989,
when she slipped on a rug in her home and fractured her hip. While recuperating from her hip
fracture in January 1990, Mrs. Wanglie developed respiratory failure and was placed on a
respirator. Over the next several months numerous attempts were made to wean her from the
respirator, all proving unsuccessful. On May 23, 1990, Helga Wanglie suffered a cardiopulmo-
nary arrest that caused a lack of oxygen to her brain, rendering her permanently unconscious.
Ronald E. Cranford, Helga Wanglie's Ventilator, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1991, at
23 [hereinafter Helga Wanglie's Ventilator]. Over the next several months, Mrs. Wanglie was
evaluated by several neurology and pulmonary medical specialists who concurred in the diag-
nosis of persistent vegetative state and permanent respirator dependence. Id.
5. Alexander Capron, In Re Helga Wanglie, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1991,
at 26.
6. Helga Wanglie's Ventilator, supra note 4, at 23.
7. In addition to constant respirator support, Mrs. Wanglie was treated with antibiotics
for recurrent pneumonia, artificially fed, and treated for electrolyte and fluid imbalance. Id. at
23.
8. This language was used in a letter to Oliver Wanglie, Helga Wanglie's husband, from
the medical director of the Hennepin County Medical Center (the facility in which Mrs. Wan-
glie was being treated). Id.
9. Id.
10. Mrs. Wanglie's immediate family consisted of her husband Oliver, a son, and a
daughter. Id. In an interview in January 1991, Mrs. Wanglie's daughter Ruth was quoted as
saying: "Mother... said that if anything happened to her, she wouldn't want her life prema-
turely shortened if she wasn't able to take care of herself." B.D. Colen, Fight Over Life;
Against Family Wishes, A Minnesota Hospital May Go To Court In An Effort To End Measures
Keeping A Woman Alive By Artificial Means, NEWSDAY (Nassau ed.), Jan. 29, 1991, at 63.
Oliver Wanglie describes himself and his wife as "pro-lifers." Id. He argues that "only God
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tal impasse between the hospital staff and the Wanglie family, but by the
end of 1990 it became clear no resolution was forthcoming.11 Thus, in
what was heralded as the first case of its kind, 12 on February 8, 1991, a
physician affiliated with the Hennepin County Medical Center filed a pe-
tition in a Minnesota trial court asking that a conservator be appointed
for Mrs. Wanglie to "make appropriate recommendations to the court to
determine what is in the best interest of the patient." 13 Although the
case was widely perceived as one in which the hospital was seeking per-
mission from the court to terminate life-sustaining treatment over the
objections of a patient's family,14 the petition merely asked the court to
decide who should direct the course of Helga Wanglie's medical care-
her husband Oliver Wanglie or someone else.15
Following a four-day emotionally charged trial, 16 the court rendered
its decision on July 1, 1991.17 Judge Patricia L. Belois found clear and
convincing evidence that Oliver Wanglie was the best person to be the
guardian for his wife. 18 She stressed Mr. Wanglie was in the best posi-
tion "to investigate and act upon Helga Wanglie's conscientious, reli-
gious and moral beliefs." 19 Judge Belois acknowledged the dispute
can take life and that doctors should not play God." Helga Wanglie's Ventilator, supra note 4,
at 23.
11. Id at23.
12. See At Odds With Family, Hospital Seeks to End Life, CHI. TIB., Jan. 10, 1991, at
C4.
13. Petition Filed Today For Appointment of General Conservator for Patient At Hennepin
County Medical Center, PR NEWSWiRE, Feb. 8, 1991. "The petiion... was filed by Steven
H. Miles, a gerontologist who served as an ethical consultant to Mrs. Wanglie's physicians at
the Hennepin County Medical Center." Capron, supra note 5, at 26.
14. Dr. Miles's petition did not, as was widely reported, seek permission to terminate
Mrs. Wanglie's care. See, eg., Life In The Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1991, § 4, at 7
(reporting "a hospital is preparing to ask the courts for permission to let a patient die against
the wishes of the next of kin"). In fact, the petition requested only that an independent third
party be appointed to decide whether continued treatment for Mrs. Wanglie was appropriate.
Dr. Miles argued Mrs. Wanglie's current guardian, her husband, "is not competent to be
Helga Wanglie's conservator with regard to making decisions about her shelter, medical care,
and religious requirements." In re Wanglie, at 11. On May 2, 1991, Mr. Wanglie filed an
Amended Petition for Appointment of a Guardian (Person and Estate) asking the court to
appoint him Conservator of the Person of his wife. Id at 1.
15. The trial court framed the question presented by the petition as follows: "The Court
is asked whether it is in the best interest of an elderly woman who is comatose, gravely ill, and
ventilator-dependent to have decisions about her medical care made by her husband of 53
years or by a stranger." In re Wanglie, at 11.
16. Trial was held in the District Court, Probate Court Division, Fourth Judicial District
for the County of Hennepin, State of Minnesota from May 28, 1991 through May 31, 1991.
I d at 1.
17. Id
18. Id at 13.
19. Id In what can be seen as an ironic ending to the Wanglie family saga, Helga Wan-
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between Mr. Wanglie and the hospital over Mrs. Wanglie's treatment,
but noted, "Except with regard to the issue of removing the ventilator,
[Mr. Wanglie] has thoughtfully agreed with the treating physicians about
every major decision in his wife's care."'20
Judge Belois's holding gave Helga Wanglie the right to demand, 21
and perhaps implicitly the right to receive, intensive medical treatment
that at least some physicians felt was medically inappropriate. Thus, if
Cruzan is properly pegged as a case about the "right to die," Wanglie
surely stands as a contrasting, yet complimentary case about the "right
to live." On a factual level, Cruzan stands in contrast to Wanglie in that
Cruzan's family sought to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, while the
Wanglie family sought to continue treatment in the face of physician ob-
jection. Given this contrast, at first blush it may appear that the princi-
ples that emerged from the Cruzans' battle for the right to die could not
accommodate the dilemma faced by the Wanglies in their quest for con-
tinuation of life. But a closer look reveals the complimentary nature of
these two situations: In both cases the rights asserted by the patients'
families were met with resistance and ultimate opposition from the
health care providers caring for the incompetent patients. In the end,
both courts looked favorably on the principle of patient self-determina-
tion 22 and held that, given a sufficient level of evidence, patients or their
surrogates have the right to direct the patients' medical care even in the
face of physician opposition.
While Cruzan can rightly be heralded as a case simultaneously en-
hancing patients' rights and suppressing physician paternalism, 23 Wan-
glie defies similar characterization. While Wanglie can be seen as
another case advancing patient self-determination, it is perhaps more
properly deemed a case about patient paternalism. 24 The Wanglie deci-
glie died "of natural causes" on July 4, 1991, three days after the court appointed her husband
guardian of her person. See Helga Wanglie, Woman in Right-to-Life Battle, CHI. TRIB., July
6, 1991, at C13.
20. In re Wanglie, at 13.
21. Mrs. Wanglie's demands for treatment were made on her behalf by her family who
acted as surrogate decision makers. See Helga Wanglie's Ventilator, supra note 4, at 23.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 84-96 for a discussion of the doctrine of patient
self-determination.
23. Arguably, this proposition is correct only with respect to competent patients. After
all, the majority opinion in Cruzan draws a distinct line between the rights of competent and
incompetent patients, since these rights relate to the state's ability to interfere with the pa-
tient's medical decision making. For a discussion of the state's interest in medical decision
making as articulated in Cruzan, see John A. Robertson, Cruzan and the Constitutional Status
of Nontreatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients, 25 GA. L. REv. 1139 (1991).
24. Here I use the term "patient paternalism" to suggest a scenario in which patients
exercise their will over that of their caretakers. By definition, paternalism may not be an
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sion seems to suggest that patients have the right to regulate the conduct
of their physicians, even when a doctor's medical, moral, or ethical judg-
ment would dictate a different course. The doctors caring for Helga
Wanglie were forced to continue care that, in their professional judg-
ment, was inappropriate because it provided no medical benefit to the
patient. Yet the court seemed comfortable compelling the physicians to
compromise their own professional integrity for the sake of patient
autonomy.
The notion that a physician brings to the bedside his or her own
professional conscience is one that has received only bare recognition
from courts and policy makers who confront clashes between patients
and their doctors. Yet a physician's professional conscience, derived
from personal and professional experiences, plays a vital role in the way
in which a doctor interacts with his or her patients. At the very least,
ignoring the moral, ethical, and professional make-up of the physician
can only serve to chill communications between doctors and patients.
That is, stripped of their ability to advocate based on their own belief
system, doctors may begin to perceive themselves as "medical vending
machines" whose only role is to dispense medical treatments. 25 This im-
age of a physician as a mere purveyor of medical "goods" belies the no-
tion that an essential element of the doctor-patient relationship is open
communication about treatment options.
The concept of a physician's professional conscience implies that the
doctor is an independent moral agent with the capacity and the right to
express his or her objections to patient choices, whether those objections
derive from medical, moral, or ethical foundations. It is important to
note that expressions of professional conscience will not always translate
into sanctioning a course of treatment preferred by the physician. Physi-
entirely accurate term to describe a situation in which a patient's preferences prevail over the
medical judgment of the physician. Paternalism implies an authority supplying the needs or
regulating the conduct of those under its control. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 862 (9th ed. 1984). While a patient may not be an authority in the sense that the
physician is subordinate to the patient in the doctor/patient relationship, certainly the court in
Wanglie approved of the patient's right to control the conduct of the physician. This, I argue,
is patient paternalism.
25. See Lawrence J. Nelson & Robert M. Nelson, Ethics and the provision offutile, harm-
ful or burdensome treatment to children, 20 CRITICAL CARE MED. 427 (1992) (charging phy-
sicians who merely follow their patient's decisions without discussing their clinical judgment
and ethical wisdom are practicing "vending machine" medicine). Other possible harmful con-
sequences of ignoring or even substantially downplaying the physician's professional con-
science include forcing doctors to refrain from offering treatments to patients during an acute
medical episode for fear of never being able to recommend withdrawal of treatment, and dis-
couraging students from entering the medical field because they envision a lack of autonomy in
their role as clinicians.
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cian conduct will continue to be governed by established standards of
care. Assertion of a physician's professional conscience will not mean
that a doctor can offer a quality and degree of medical care that is below
accepted standards; it simply means that a physician will be accorded the
right to choose whether to initiate or continue a course of treatment that
offends some deeply held personal beliefs.
This Article examines the role a physician's professional conscience
plays in the jurisprudence of medical decision making. Medical science
and technology offers us an increasing array of therapeutics and appara-
tuses that can effectively sustain biologic existence, but which often can-
not work cures or even reprieves from underlying illnesses. Thus,
physicians perceive the application of these advances as medically futile
or inappropriate in some cases. At the same time, the jurisprudence of
patient autonomy has advanced to the point where many patients feel
comfortable, even empowered, in seeking whatever treatments are avail-
able, often disregarding cost, prognosis, and ultimately the advice of their
physician. Thus begins the so-called "clash at the bedside."
Part I of this Article focuses on the issue of medically futile treat-
ment, a phenomenon that I believe has ushered the doctor-patient clash
at the bedside to the forefront of bioethics. When doctors and patients
disagree over the wisdom and value of providing life-sustaining treat-
ment, questions arise about how the concept of benefit should be defined,
evaluated, and weighed in the hospital setting. The concept of benefit
thus plays a critical role in understanding the notion of medically futile
treatment. Part I analyzes the concept of benefit as it relates to medical
treatment and medical futility. Subpart A of Part I describes a few of the
cases that have raised the issue of medical futility publicly. Subpart B
focuses on the definitions of medical futility provided by physicians and
policy makers, concluding that there is a general lack of consensus in
defining what constitutes medically futile treatment. Without consensus,
the debate about medical futility shifts away from problems of definition
toward questions about a physician's duty to provide treatment he or she
believes will provide no medical benefit to the patient. Subpart C ad-
dresses these questions.
Part II examines the patient's right to demand medical treatment
and the physician's duty to deliver such treatment. Subpart A explores
this latter concept in the context of the common law's purported concern
with upholding the ethical integrity of the medical profession. By explor-
ing the underpinnings and development of this common-law interest, one
can see the emergence of a physician's professional conscience as a com
ponent of the jurisprudence of medical decision making. Subpart B ex
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plains the role a physician's professional conscience, plays in cases
involving patient abandonment, transfer, and refusal to provide contin-
ued care. What emerges from this case survey is a clear need for a more
uniform approach to the clash at the bedside. That is, courts and hospi-
tals alike seem ill-equipped and inconsistent in their response to a physi-
cian's assertion of professional conscience.
Part III of this Article explores legislative responses to a physician's
assertion of professional conscience. In contrast to the courts' somewhat
scattered approach to clashes of conscience at the bedside, law makers in
numerous states have carved out specific instances in which a doctor may
refuse to participate in certain medical procedures on moral or ethical
grounds. Subpart A addresses the most striking example of this legisla-
tive safe harbor-the performance of abortions. A majority of states per-
mit a doctor to opt out of participating in the procedure on the ground
that it offends his or her conscience. What these abortion refusal statutes
demonstrate is that our society is sensitive to the fact that doctors are not
mere technicians who, because of their special training, must use their
skills whenever asked. Instead, society accords physicians a right to
moral autonomy in selected clinical settings. Given the existence of legis-
lation recognizing and respecting a physician's professional conscience in
certain instances, Subpart B of Part III argues that our jurisprudence
should offer greater protection for physician autonomy in a wider clinical
setting.
Part IV proposes a model for systematically handling conflicts be-
tween doctors and patients over the provision of certain medical treat-
ment. Adapted from a model currently in place to resolve conflicts
between attorneys and their clients, the proposed model in this Article
attempts to uphold the principles of patient autonomy and self-determi-
nation, while at the same time respecting a physician's professional con-
science. Subpart B proposes that hospitals create treatment evaluation
boards (TEBs) to hear and resolve disputes between doctors and patients
within the confines of the hospital, obviating the need for judicial inter-
vention. This Article contemplates that if doctors are given an open
arena to air concerns about patients' choices, the doctor-patient relation-
ship will ultimately be enhanced.
In sum, this Article argues that in a world in which patients per-
ceive an abundance of medical technology at their disposal, physicians
should not be forced to choose between what they think is in the best
interest of the patient and what the patient demands. Mutual and equal
respect for patient and physician autonomy will facilitate dialogue and
resolve the clash at the bedside.
August 1993]
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1. Medical Futility: Challenging the Underpinnings
of Patient Autonomy
A. The Case of Helga Wanglie: Focusing the Debate on a Patient's Right
to Futile Care
The issue of a physician's duty to comply with a patient's treatment
wishes likely arises in virtually every health care institution on a regular
basis. After all, it is inconceivable that Helga Wanglie's family was
unique in their quest for continued treatment of their comatose mother.
But is Helga Wanglie representative of patients who, of their own accord
or through their families,26 seek treatment their physicians deem of no
medical benefit?27 Perhaps one would envision the prototype of such a
patient to be, like Mrs. Wanglie, an octogenarian, 28 from a religious
background,29 who is an integral member of a close family.30 These
26. Throughout this Article, the term "patient" means a decision maker about medical
treatment, and is intended to include surrogate decision makers who are making medical deci-
sions on behalf of incompetent patients. The proposals contained herein are equally applicable
when a patient or his or her surrogate demands treatment the physician finds inappropriate.
This assertion, of course, assumes the surrogate is the appropriate spokesperson for the patient
and is either expressing views previously expressed by the patient or acting in the patient's best
interest.
Whether a surrogate is truly acting as the patient would act must be of concern to every
physician who looks to someone other than the patient to discern treatment preferences. This
Article's arguments and proposals are premised on the assumption that the physicians and
institutions involved in a patient-physician conflict have already crossed the surrogate ap-
proval threshold and believe the surrogate decision maker is acting as the patient would. If
physicians believe otherwise, then their dispute with surrogates would focus on the decision
maker, rather than the decision itself. While the appropriateness of particular surrogate deci-
sion makers is an important consideration in the area of medical decision making for incompe-
tent patients, it is beyond the scope of this Article. For a more complete discussion of this
issue, see John Hardwig, The Problem of Proxies with Interests of Their Own: Toward a Better
Theory of Proxy Decisions, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 803.
27. Dr. Steven Miles, the physician and ethics consultant who filed the petition for ap-
pointment of an independent conservator for Mrs. Wanglie, reports that her physicians sug-
gested that life-sustaining treatment be withdrawn "since it was not benefiting the patient."
Steven H. Miles, Informed Demand for "Non-Beneficial" Medical Treatment, 325 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 512, 513 (1991) [hereinafter Miles, Informed Demand]. Dr. Miles later elaborates on
this point, explaining that Mrs. Wanglie was at the end of her life and "the respirator was
'non-beneficial,' in that it could not heal her lungs, palliate her suffering, or enable this uncon-
scious and permanently respirator-dependent woman to experience the benefit of the life af-
forded by respirator support." Id. Thus, it appears Dr. Miles's concept of medical benefit
encompasses more than mere extension of biologic existence. For a more complete discussion
of the concept of medical benefit, see infra text accompanying notes 51-64.
28. At the time of her death, Helga Wanglie was 86 years old. See In re Wanglie, at 8.
29. Judge Belois described Mrs. Wanglie as follows: "[She] is a devout Lutheran and a
dedicated churchwoman who served her congregation for many years as a Sunday school
teacher." See id. at 2.
30. Family closeness defies formal definition and any such characterization is best left to
those for whom the term is relevant. In the case of Helga Wanglie, it is interesting to note her
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characteristics conjure up the image of someone who has reached the end
of their predicted lifespan-someone for whom death would be an antici-
pated, inevitable reality, but who holds on to the hope that medicine can
prolong a waning life.
In fact, the faces of patients and families who have battled with phy-
sicians for care deemed to be nonbeneficial are as diverse from that of
Helga Wanglie as they are from each other. If anything, Helga Wanglie
represents one point along a broad spectrum of patient characteristics.
Although it is not possible to fully describe the breadth of this spectrum
because few families reveal their conflicts to a court or to the media,
those cases that have aired in the public domain demonstrate how wide-
spread the conflict between patient and physician is becoming.
For instance, patients who seek continued care in the face of physi-
cian objection are not always elderly. In 1988, Murray Pollack, a Wash-
ington, D.C. physician, went to court seeking authority to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment from a severely brain-damaged two month old boy.
Like the petitioning physician in Wanglie, this doctor asked the court to
appoint an independent guardian for the child in place of his mother,
who demanded that her son be given what the physician considered futile
treatment. 31 In that case, the court declined to appoint an independent
guardian for the child.32
Three years later, this same physician confronted the case of Baby
Rena, an eighteen-month-old child dying of AIDS. In this case, Dr. Pol-
lack tried unsuccessfully to convince Rena's foster parents that continued
use of the respirator was wrong because "[i]t was making the child suf-
fer."'33 Although the case was never brought to court, it was the subject
of several hospital ethics committee meetings in which the foster parents
daughter Ruth, age 48, had always lived in her parents' home. Also, both daughter Ruth and
husband Oliver report having had conversations with Mrs. Wanglie about what she would
want "if anything happened to her." Colen, supra note 10, at 63.
31. See Benjamin Weiser, A Question of Letting Go; Child's Trauma Drives Doctors to
Reexamine Ethical Role, WAsH. POST, July 14, 1991, at Al.
32. Id. At the time Dr. Pollack was interviewed for the Washington Post article, he
reported that the boy "remains in a coma, breathing through a respirator at a long-term care
facility." Id. at A18. He also remarked, "It was the wrong decision for everyone." Id.
33. Id at Al. The article describes Rena as a victim of AIDS and heart disease who was
hospitalized in the intensive care unit in January 1991. She could breathe only with the help of
a respirator and was in so much pain that she was constantly sedated. The author reports,
"When nurses performed even the simplest procedure, such as weighing her, her blood pres-
sure shot up and tears streamed down her face. But a tube in her throat made it impossible for
her to utter a sound." Id
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and the physicians met to air their opposing views.34 In the end, Baby
Rena died despite continued aggressive care.35
The case of Baby L further exemplifies the conflict that arises when
physicians and parents clash over medical intervention doctors say pro-
vides no benefit for an infant patient. Baby L was a two-year-old girl
who was blind, deaf, and quadriplegic. She received her nutrition
through a gastrostomy tube36 and required occasional mechanical venti-
lation (use of a respirator) for recurrent pneumonia. 37 Her treating phy-
sicians felt that due to her extensive neurologic deficits, she could
experience only pain, such that further medical intervention was not in
the best interest of the patient.38 Therefore, they sought the mother's
permission to withhold use of the respirator should the infant experience
further breathing problems. 39 The mother refused to consent, and in-
stead went to court to resolve the conflict.4 0
Another recent incident moves along the spectrum of patient types
from infant to adolescent. In October 1991 an Atlanta Superior Court
judge was asked to decide the fate of a thirteen-year-old girl suffering
from an irreversible, degenerative neurological disorder.4 1  After five
months of intensive treatment, physicians argued that their "life-sus-
taining efforts [were] becom[ing] so painful as to be abusive."' 42 The hos-
pital sought the court's permission to discontinue treatment for the
patient, referred to as "Jane Doe," over the objection of her father.43
34. Benjamin Weiser, While Child Suffered, Beliefs Clashed, WASH. POST, July 15, 199 1,
at Al. In this article, the author hints that one reason the hospital did not go to court may
have been because it "had been turned down once before by a court when doctors wanted to
overrule a parent's demand for continued treatment." Id. For a personal account of Dr. Pol-
lack's struggle with the case of Baby Rena, see Murray M. Pollack, Surrogate Decision Makers
and Respect: Commentary on "The Many Faces of Autonomy," 3 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 303
(1992).
35. Weiser, supra note 34, at Al.
36. A gastrostomy tube is a tube placed into a new opening to the stomach. STEDMAN'S
MED. DICTIONARY 578 (illustrated 5th unabr. lawyers' ed. 1982).
37. John J. Paris et al., Physicians' Refusal of Requested Treatment; The Case of Baby L,
322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1012 (1990). The doctors also reported the court (no details as to the
jurisdiction of the court are given) appointed a guardian ad litem for the child. The guardian
ad litem asked a pediatric neurologist from another institution to assess the patient's condition
and make recommendations about care. Eventually, the pediatric neurologist agreed to take
over the patient's case, so Baby L was transferred to her care. Two years after the court




41. See Ronald Smothers, Atlanta Court Bars Efforts to End Life Support for Stricken




The court denied the hospital's request, holding that "it is up to the par-
ents of Jane Doe to decide when, for how long and at what cost to their
child to extend her life and the manner of her death, even if it may be
prolonged as a result." 44
The case of Jane Doe stands in contrast to that of Helga Wanglie,
not only because of the difference in the ages and life experiences of the
two patients, but also because of the families' role in reaching a decision
contrary to physician recommendations. In Wanglie, it appears the fam-
ily decision makers were united in their request for continued care. In
the case of Jane Doe, her mother and father disagreed over what was in
their daughter's best interest; her mother reluctantly agreed to authorize
removal of life support, while her father flatly rejected any cutback in
treatment. Faced with this conflict between the two parent decision
makers, the court opted for continued treatment until the conflict could
be resolved. 45
Finally, Helga Wanglie can be contrasted with fifty-six-year-old Jo-
seph Finelli, who suffered severe brain damage following a heart trans-
plant operation in 1988. Unlike Mrs. Wanglie, Mr. Finelli did not
require a respirator to breathe. He did, however, require constant care,
including feeding and administration of immune-suppressing medication
to prevent rejection of his transplanted heart.46 Mr. Finelli remained
hospitalized for three years after his transplant, at which time the hospi-
tal petitioned a Suffolk County Probate Court in Massachusetts to ap-
point a guardian to determine the most appropriate placement for the
patient.47 The court appointed an independent guardian who, after a six-
month investigation, recommended Mr. Finelli be taken off the medica-
tion that prevented his body from rejecting his heart.48 Without his med-
44. Id The presiding Fulton County Superior Court judge, Leah Sears-Collins, also or-
dered the State Attorney General to appeal her ruling to the state supreme court "so that the
case could carry legal precedent in the state." Id William M. Droze, an Assistant Attorney
General, filed a notice of appeal on October 18, 1991. See Ronald Smothers, Ailing Girl at
Center of Fight Over Life Dies, N.Y. TIMES, October 26, 1991, § 1, at 6. Jane Doe died of
cardiac arrest on October 25, 1991. Id
45. Specifically, Judge Sears-Collins said "if either parent, in the exercise of his or her
rights with regard to the welfare of Jane Doe, makes the decision to continue Jane Doe's life,
as the father has in this case, that decision must be respected." See Smothers, Atlanta Court
Bars Efforts, supra note 44.
46. See Alexander Reid, After Transplant, A Fight Over Care, BOSTON GLOBE, June 23,
1991, at 21.
47. At the time the action was filed, Mr. Finelli was a full-time resident of the Brigham
and Women's Hospital, the petitioner in his case. His family took him home every day, but
returned him to the hospital at night since he required round-the-clock attention. Id.
48. Alexander Reid, Judge Rejects Proposal to Let Revere Man Die, BOSTON GLOBE, July
12, 1991, at 55.
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ication, Mr. Finelli would die in short order.49 The court refused to rule
on the guardian's treatment withdrawal recommendation. Instead, the
court ordered the hospital to pay the salary of a home care worker, en-
abling Mr. Finelli to leave the hospital.50
The case of Joseph Finelli stands as a reminder that life-sustaining
treatment does not always come in the form of invasive machinery such
as respirators and feeding tubes, nor does its administration have to be a
source of constant pain for the dying patient. But whatever the modal-
ity-be it the respirators ventilating Helga Wanglie and Baby Rena, the
gastrostomy tube feeding Baby L, or the drugs keeping Joseph Finelli
alive-medical treatment that serves only to maintain rudimentary bio-
logic function has generated dispute and debate among health care pro-
fessionals. This debate focuses on the duty of a physician to prescribe
medical treatment he or she believes to be of no medical benefit to the
patient. Many physicians have referred to nonbeneficial treatment as
"futile" and have asserted their right to unilaterally withhold or with-
draw such therapy even in the face of patient opposition. Before explor-
ing the parameters of a physician's duty to provide such treatment, it is
important to more clearly define medically futile treatment.
B. The Definition of Medically Futile Treatment: Elusive At Best
The concept of medically futile treatment can be viewed simultane-
ously as having ancient roots and as a modem concept emerging only in
the last several decades. One author suggests that medical practice has
proscribed futile therapy from its beginnings, as evidenced by the Hippo-
cratic tradition obliging physicians not to treat incurable diseases.51 The
more recent focus on the concept of medical futility can be attributed in
49. The court-appointed guardian, Betty Dew, is an attorney and a former nurse.
Although her initial charge from the court was merely to determine an appropriate placement
for Mr. Finelli, since he no longer required treatment in an acute care hospital, she said her
recommendations were in the best interest of the patient. She stated: "I felt that the idea of
Mr. Finelli being incapacitated the way he is would have been totally unacceptable to him....
It was my judgment that he would not have wanted to live the way he is now." Id.
50. Alexander Reid, Judge Orders Hospital to Pay for Brain-Injured Man's Home Care
Aide, BOSTON GLOBE, July 18, 1991, at 33. Judge Edward S. Ginsberg said he would restrict
his decision to whether Mr. Finelli should be discharged from the hospital and to where he
should be discharged. Id.
51. See Darrel W. Amundsen, The Physician's Obligation to Prolong Life: A Medical
Duty Without Classical Roots-What the Hippocratic Corpus Does Not Say, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Aug. 1978, at 23, 25 (stating that the Hippocratic Corpus defines a role of
medicine as refusing to treat those who are "overmastered by their diseases," because "in such
cases medicine is powerless").
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large part to the development of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) in
1960.52
While CPR was originally developed for victims of sudden cardiac
or respiratory arrest, its use has gradually increased to the point where it
is presently used on any patient in the hospital who has a cardiac arrest,
regardless of their underlying illness.5 3 The elevation of CPR to a rou-
tine hospital practice has engendered numerous studies on its efficacy,
focusing particularly on survival rates of patients who receive CPR.54
When studies consistently showed that less than fifteen percent of pa-
tients who received CPR survived to leave the hospital, physicians began
to question whether they were obligated to administer, or even offer, this
therapy to patients they felt would surely not survive a cardiac arrest.55
Thus began a debate about the provision of perceived futile medical treat-
ment that has since reached well beyond CPR to the limits of medical
technologies.
To date, numerous physicians and ethicists have entered the debate
about medical futility, but only a few have attempted to define the con-
cept. For the most part, definitions of medical futility revolve around the
goal of medical therapy and the benefit a particular patient can gain from
that therapy. For example, one group of medical ethicists argues that
"[m]edical intervention can be called futile... if the results are tempo-
rary and fleeting and will not improve the patient's condition. '5 6 Others
suggest futile treatment is that which has no reasonable expectation of
benefit.57 Still others have described it as "treatment that prolongs the
process of dying but offers no realistic chance of improvement.158
52. See W.B. Kouwenhoven et al., Closed-Chest Cardiac Massage, 173 JAMA 1064
(1960).
53. See Leslie J. Blackhall, Must We Always Use CPR?, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1281
(1987). CPR, or any medical treatment for that matter, is not administered to patients who
request not to receive such treatment. An order to withhold CPR is often referred to as a "do-
not-resuscitate" (DNR) order. Id at 1282.
54. See, eg., S.E. Bedell et al., SurvivalAfter Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation in the Hospi-
tal, 309 NEw ENG. J. MED. 569 (1983); Mark L. DeBard, Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation:
Analysis of Six Years'Experience and Review of the Literature, 10 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED.
408 (1981); Arnold L. Johnson et al., Results of Cardiac Resuscitation in 552 Patients, 20 AM.
J. CARDIOLOGY 831 (1967); R.C. Peatfield et al., Survival After Cardiac Arrest in Hospital, 1
LANCET 1223 (1977). For a discussion of the development of CPR as a standard of care for
cardiac arrest, see Blackhall, supra note 53, at 1282.
55. See id
56. See ALBERT R. JONSEN ET AL., CLINICAL ETHICS 27 (2d ed. 1986).
57. See John M. Stanley, The Appleton Consensus: suggested international guidelines for
decision to forego medical treatment, 15 J. MED. ETHICS 129, 130 (1989).
58. William A. Knaus et al., Do Objective Estimates of Chances for Survival Influence
Decisions to Withhold or Withdraw Treatment?, 10 MED. DECISION MAKING 163, 163 (1990).
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The foregoing definitions of futile treatment, which focus on the
rather amorphous relationship between treatment and benefit, have been
criticized for not offering the clinician an objective measure for determin-
ing when medical treatment is futile. In an effort to objectify the concept
of medical futility, one group of medical ethicists proposed a quantitative
approach to its definition.5 9 Dr. Lawrence Schneiderman and his col-
leagues define medical futility as "any effort to achieve a result that is
possible but that reasoning or experience suggests is highly improbable
and that cannot be systematically produced." 6 They further refine this
quantitative approach by suggesting that "when physicians conclude
(either through personal experience, experiences shared with colleagues,
or consideration of reported empiric data) that in the last 100 cases, a
medical treatment has been useless, they should regard that treatment as
futile."'61 Dr. Schneiderman defines "useless" as therapy that achieves a
desired result in less than one percent of cases. 62
Any single definition of medical futility, be it qualitative (focusing
on the nature of individual benefit) or quantitative (focusing on the de-
gree of overall success), can be criticized for failing to include some com-
ponent of individual patient goals. For example, while one patient may
refuse CPR because she is informed of the low likelihood that she will
ever leave the hospital, another patient may request that he be resusci-
tated just for the chance that he might be alive to see the arrival of a close
relative, or his next birthday, or another sunrise. What is all too obvious
to physicians is that patients differ in their goals for treatment, in their
assessment of treatment benefit, and in their perception about quality of
life.
Without some deference to individual patient goals, no definition of
futility will ever be suitable for universal application. Thus, the question
that should arise from cases like Wanglie is not whether a particular
treatment meets some definition of medical futility. The question should
be whether, given the likelihood of a beneficial result, 63 coupled with the
59. Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al., Medical Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical Implica-
tions, 112 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 949 (1990).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 952. Dr. Schneiderman and his colleagues are not the only ones to define
medical futility in terms of chances for success. See, e.g., J.D. Lantos et al., Survival After
Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation in Babies of Very Low Birth Weight, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED.
91 (1988) (invoking notion of futility when survival is no greater than 7%); Donald J. Murphy
et al., Outcomes of Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation in the Elderly, 111 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 199 (1989) (suggesting that CPR is futile when patient survival following therapy is no
greater than 2%).
63. Beneficial result must include any result the patient considers beneficial to him or her.
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patient's treatment goals, a physician has a duty to provide treatment.
The answer to this question will depend on how much deference is given
to a patient's perception of benefit in relation to medical treatment.
For example, if we say that treatment can never be futile so long as
the patient perceives it to provide some benefit, then in certain instances
physicians will be under a duty to provide treatment that exceeds current
thresholds of care.64 Instead, medical futility may be better defined by
discerning the likelihood that a particular treatment will produce the
benefit sought by the patient. If treatment will not produce a benefit
sought by the patient, it can be considered futile. Even if this definition is
workable in the health care setting, questions remain as to the physician's
duty to render futile care.
C. Physician Perception of the Duty to Render Futile Care
While Wanglie is characterized as a case about medical futility,65 the
question presented to the trial judge in Wanglie was, on its face, a ques-
tion about who could best represent the interests of the incompetent pa-
tientA6 As framed, the issue was not the more troubling question of
whether physicians have a duty to prescribe treatment they believe pro-
vides no medical benefit. 67 Yet despite the seeming clarity and simplicity
of the question before the court, the petition filed in Wanglie was
In the case of surrogate decision makers, beneficial result should include any result the surro-
gates consider beneficial to the patient.
64. Drs. Tom Tomlinson and Howard Brody point out several instances in which patient
perception of benefit is inaccurate and thus the physician should not allow the patient to de-
mand treatment. For example, a patient who demands antibiotics for a simple cold, Tomlin-
son and Brody argue, will derive no physiological benefit from such treatment. Tom
Tomlinson & Howard Brody, Futility and the Ethics of Resuscitation, 264 JAMA 1276, 1277
(1990). Moreover, even if the patient believes that the drugs will help psychologically by hav-
ing a placebo effect, the patient should have no right to demand this treatment.
I agree that there are certain instances in which a patient simply cannot demand that a
physician provide treatment. For example, a patient experiencing leg soreness cannot demand
amputation just to rid himself of the pain if the surgery is contraindicated. But I tend to define
this example and others like it as falling outside the standard of care so as to constitute medical
malpractice. This Article is not intended to address those situations, but rather instances when
a patient's demand for treatment is within the standard of care but outside the scope of the
physician's professional conscience.
65. See, for example, Daniel Callahan, Medical Futility, Medical Necessity: The-Problem-
Without-A-Name, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1991, at 30, in which the author states
that the Helga Wanglie case has brought the meaning of medical futility into prominence.
66. In re Wanglie, at 11.
67. The trial court recognized the possibility that, given the media attention swirling
around the case, some could be misled about exactly what the court was deciding. Perhaps in
an effort to clarify the procedural posture of the case, the court stated at the outset of its
Memorandum decision: "The Court is asked whether it is in the best interest of an elderly
woman who is comatose, gravely ill, and ventilator-dependent to have decisions about her
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designed to confront, albeit indirectly, the question of a physician's duty
to provide nonbeneficial care. Dr. Steven Miles, who petitioned the court
on behalf of the medical staff caring for Mrs. Wanglie, later described the
case as raising two important questions: "Is respirator support of Helga
Wanglie beneficial to her? If not, are medical staff obliged to provide it
because of the strong preferences of her family?" 68
The court in Wanglie did not begin to address these questions, nor
was any judicial light shed on similar questions raised by the cases of
Baby L, Jane Doe, or Joseph Finelli. But the absence of judicial analysis
in this area of medical ethics should not be mistaken for a total absence
of thoughtful analysis of questions that are certain to engender much
debate given the tension between the rapid development of medical tech-
nologies and the escalating cost of health care.69 In the face of these
ever-present medical and fiscal realities, physicians have begun to debate
their responsibility to disclose and provide medical treatment options
they deem futile. As one might expect, physicians' views on this subject
are varied.
To begin, physicians often approach the question of medical futility
at the pretreatment stage, that is, debating whether there is a duty to
offer a treatment that provides no medical benefit. 70 If medical literature
medical care made by her husband of 53 years or by a stranger." Id. at 13. To further forestall
misinterpretation about the ramifications of its holding, the court made clear that
[n]o court order to continue or stop any medical treatment for Helga Wanglie has
been made or requested at this time. Whether such a request will be made, or such
an order is proper, or this Court would make such an order, and whether Oliver
Wanglie would execute such an order are speculative matters not now before the
Court.
Id. at 15.
68. Steven H. Miles, Legal Procedures in Wanglie: A Two-Step, Not a Sidestep, 2 J.
CLINICAL ETHICS 285, 285 (1991). Dr. Miles has written several other articles about his per-
sonal involvement in and sentiments about the Wanglie litigation. See, e.g., Stephen H. Miles,
Interpersonal Issues in the Wanglie Case, 2 KENNEDY INSTITUTE OF ETHICS J. 61 (1992)
[hereinafter Miles, Issues]; Stephen H. Miles, Autonomy's Responsibility: A Gloss on the Wan-
glie Affair, 10 HEALTH PROGRESS, Dec. 1991, at 30; Miles, Informed Demand, supra note 27.
69. Americans currently spend $838 billion, 14% of the Gross National Product (GNP),
per year on health care. Ronald I. Deutsch, It's Time to Push Health Reform Forward, S.F.
CHRON., July 21, 1993, at A21. This figure is up from 9.4% of the GNP in 1980. Janice
Castro, Condition: Critical, TIME, Nov. 25, 1991, at 34-35 (cited in Eric Lambard Robinson,
Note, The Oregon Basic Health Services Act: A Model for State Reform?, 45 VAND. L. REV.
977, 977 (1992)).
70. The issue of pretreatment decision making was not presented in Wanglie because the
respirator therapy was well underway when the ethical dilemma surrounding Mrs. Wanglie's
care arose. Importantly, in no account of the Wanglie case does anyone suggest that the respi-
rator should not have been offered to Mrs. Wanglie in the first place. The Wanglie dilemma
demonstrates how fluid judgments about medical futility can be. While no one felt offering the
respirator following cardiopulmonary arrest was futile, the medical staff generally agreed that
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can serve as a gauge of physician sentiment, it appears that a majority of
physicians subscribe to the view that they are under no obligation to offer
futile therapy. 71 The American Medical Association Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs agrees. In a recent pronouncement of guidelines for
the appropriate use of do-not-resuscitate orders, the AMA stated: "A
physician is not ethically obligated to make a specific diagnostic or thera-
peutic procedure available to a patient, even on specific request, if the use
of such a procedure would be futile." 72
The AMA policy statement is careful to point out that, given the
diversity of physician and patient values, judgments of futility are subject
to a wide variety of interpretations. 73 The AMA concludes that judg-
ments of futility are appropriate so long as the patient determines what is
or is not beneficial according to his or her personal values and priori-
ties.74 Once that judgment is made, the AMA concludes that treatment
would be considered futile if it could not be expected to achieve the goals
expressed by the informed patient, and therefore could be withheld even
if requested by the patient.75 Thus, the AMA, as well as many individual
physicians, seems to take the position that doctors may make a final and
after several months, maintaining Mrs. Wanglie on the respirator was medically inappropriate.
The situation in Wanglie raises the question of whether a physician has a duty to continue
treatment once it has proved ineffective. At least one court has said no to this question. In
Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983), the California court
stated: "Although there may be a duty to provide life-sustaining machinery in the immediate
aftermath of a cardio-respiratory arrest, there is no duty to continue its use once it has become
futile in the opinion of qualified medical personnel." The court went on to admit it could not
offer precise guidelines about what constitutes futile treatment, urging such decisions are essen-
tially medical ones to be made on a case-by-case basis. Ia
71. See, eg., Blackhall, supra note 53, at 1284 (stating that in cases in which CPR is of
no benefit, it should not be offered to patients); Donald J. Murphy & David B. Matchar, Life-
Sustaining Therapy; A Model for Appropriate Use, 264 JAMA 2103 (1990) (stating that if ther-
apy is either medically or economically inappropriate, it should not be automatically offered);
Schneiderman, supra note 59, at 949 (stating that treatment that fails to improve the person as
a whole is futile and may be withheld by physicians); Tomlinson & Brady, supra note 64, at
1278-79 (stating that physicians must be able to restrict alternatives offered to patients for sake
of physician integrity and patient autonomy). Additionally, a leading treatise on clinical medi-
cal ethics states bluntly: "There is no moral obligation to perform useless or futile actions."
JONSEN, supra note 56, at 27.
72. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Guidelines
for the Appropriate Use of Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders, 265 JAMA 1868, 1870 (1991).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. The particular treatment the AMA refers to in these guidelines is CPR, but the
language used throughout the discussion is broad and does not appear to be limited to CPR.
For example, the AMA urges physicians to talk with patients about their objectives and then
"convey to the patient whether CPR or other medical treatments are likely to be effective in
helping to achieve those goals." Id. (emphasis added).
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unilateral decision to withhold treatment when they deem it futile, by
whatever definition of the term they have adopted.
Not all physicians agree with this position. Some argue that unilat-
eral decision making by physicians, in any context, violates principles of
patient autonomy that have come to dominate the patient-physician rela-
tionship. One physician, for example, argues that a unilateral decision to
withhold CPR is highly paternalistic and involves value judgments that
can only be made by the patient.76 In a similar vein, another group of
physicians has said "patient preferences about the goals of therapy are an
essential component of the clinical determination of futility." 77 While
this position may seem to comport with that taken by the AMA, this
group goes on to say that when the patient and physician disagree about
whether treatment is futile, the patient may demand, and presumably
receive, therapy that the physician believes will not be beneficial. 78
Thus, physicians' views about what constitutes futile medical ther-
apy range from treatment that will not prevent proximate death, to treat-
ment that holds a quantifiably low probability of physiologic benefit, to
therapy that a patient believes will not achieve his or her treatment goals.
Given that perceptions of medical futility range from a purely objective
medical judgment79 to a highly subjective individual judgment that may
look well beyond medical ramifications, it seems the medical community
is not likely to reach a consensus on how the concept should be defined.
Definitions, however, serve only to alert physicians to the existence of a
particular class of treatment. The more important question is: Once a
physician makes a determination that treatment is futile in a particular
case, how should that physician respond when faced with the patient
who demands that futile therapy? Should a physician be compelled,
either by a court or by statute, to provide care when in so doing, the
physician may be violating his or her own personal or professional judg-
ment about how medicine should be practiced? In short, should doctors
be compelled to act against their professional conscience?
The answer to this difficult question can emerge only after a review
of judicial and legislative responses to assertions of physician autonomy.
If courts and law makers believe that a physician has a right to profes-
sional self-determination, then any solution to a dilemma over the provi-
76. Stuart J. Youngner, Who Defines Futility?, 260 JAMA 2094 (1988).
77. John D. Lantos et al., The Illusion of Futility in Clinical Practice, 87 AM. J. MED. 81,
83 (1989).
78. Id.
79. Arguably, no medical judgment is ever purely objective. A physician's clinical judg-
ment may be shaped by a host of factors including the patient's age, family support, compli-
ance with past prescribed therapies, or even ability to pay for costly therapy.
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sion of medically futile treatment must be one that balances the desires of
the physician and the patient. Where that balance is struck depends a
great deal on what role our legal institutions believe a physician's profes-
sional conscience should play in the world of medical decision making.
111. Physician Autonomy: Looking Toward a Doctor's
Professional Conscience
In the mid-1970s, patients and their families began going to court to
uphold their right of self-determination in medical decision making.8 0 In
virtually all of these cases, courts were asked to uphold the right of a
patient to refuse medical treatment. Many of these decisions upheld this
right in published opinions that extolled the importance of patient auton-
omy in making decisions about medical treatment."' Until recently, phy-
sician response to the burgeoning principle of patient autonomy has been
dutiful compliance; at least in the judicial setting, doctors have displayed
little or no evidence of disagreement with the notion of patient self-deter-
mination. But for the first time, in Wanglie, physicians brought to the
judicial arena concerns about the entrenchment of patient autonomy that
seem to leave no room for moral or medical judgments by the physician.
Dr. Steven Miles, the petitioner and ethical consultant in the Wan-
glie case, describes the frustration and internal conflict experienced by
several members of the health care team caring for Mrs. Wanglie: "The
nurses were feeling trapped by an endless treatment plan that obliged
them to provide treatment they did not believe was appropriate or could
benefit a dying patient."8' 2 Dr. Miles also relates that the physician at-
tending Mrs. Wanglie, a devout Catholic, did much soul-searching, in-
cluding reading the Vatican Declaration on Euthanasia, and concluded
that he was not willing to continue to prescribe the respirator.8 3 Yet
despite these strong sentiments, at no point in the trial court opinion did
the court address what role, if any, a health care provider's judgment-
moral, medical, or otherwise-might play in a decision about patient
care. Instead, the court's holding reiterates the well-settled principle of
patient autonomy and disregards whatever professional conscience the
physician may bring to the bedside.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 84-96 for a discussion of the beginnings of the
patient self-determination movement.
81. The courts have not held for the patient in every case in which the issue of patient
self-determination is raised. For a discussion of the history of the law surrounding the right to
refuse treatment, including a discussion of cases in which courts have refused to uphold a
patient's wishes, see Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270-78 (1990).
82. Miles, Issues, supra note 68, at 62.
83. Id.
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While concern for a physician compromising his or her own concept
of professional integrity may seem to have no place in the world of pa-
tient autonomy, in fact both courts and legislatures have historically re-
garded a physician's comfort with his or her actions as a high priority.
As this section demonstrates, respect for professional integrity, defined
individually by physicians, need not be submerged under the rubric of
patient autonomy. Instead, patient and physician autonomy can be bal-
anced by a system that accommodates both sets of values.
A. The Integrity of the Medical Profession as an Evolving Common-Law
Concept
In In re Quinlan,84 a case heralded for setting the foundation of a
patient's right to refuse treatment,8 5 the New Jersey Supreme Court
struggled to accommodate the divergent wishes of the parents of a se-
verely brain damaged young woman and her attending physicians.
While the dispute focused on continued use of a respirator, at the heart of
the court's decision is a discussion about control and compromise--con-
trol over medical decision making and compromise of individual and
professional integrity in surrendering that control. 86 In the end, the
court gave control over treatment decisions to the patient and her family,
but it was not unmindful of the toll that delegation might have on the
conscience and professional integrity of the physicians involved.
The physicians caring for young Karen Quinlan argued that with-
drawal of her respirator would offend "prevailing medical standards. 87
But the Quinlan court recognized that not all physicians caring for pa-
tients like Karen, perhaps not even all of Karen's physicians, felt com-
fortable adhering to a perceived standard that offended their sense of
what was morally, ethically, or medically the best course to take for their
gravely ill patients. The court articulated this dissonance between a phy-
sician's moral medical judgment and the current standard of care as fol-
lows: "[T]here must be a way to free physicians, in the pursuit of their
healing vocation, from possible contamination by self-interest or self-pro-
tection concerns which would inhibit their independent medical judg-
ments for the well-being of their dying patients. '88
84. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
85. In Cruzan, Chief Justice Rehnquist describes Quinlan as a "seminal decision" in the
right-to-refuse-treatment arena. 497 U.S. at 270.
86. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 671.
87. Id. at 664.
88. Id. at 668.
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In the end, the court offered its holding as a way of ameliorating the
professional problems at issue in the case by permitting physicians to
withdraw life-sustaining treatment at the patient's or family's request.
But more importantly, the court drew attention to the importance of the
moral and ethical integrity of individual physicians confronting patients
with whose treatment requests they profoundly disagree.
This notion that a physician's conscience is relevant to the jurispru-
dence of medical decision making was more formally delineated by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1977. In Superintendent of
Belchertown v. Saikewicz,8 9 the court relied on the right of privacy and
the right of informed consent to authorize the withholding of chemother-
apy from a profoundly retarded sixty-seven-year-old man suffering from
leukemia. In so holding, the court explained that in any judicial decision
involving termination of medical care, a court may weigh four counter-
vailing state interests against the individual's request. These state inter-
ests are: "(1) the preservation of life; (2) the protection of the interests of
innocent third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and (4) maintaining
the ethical integrity of the medical profession." 90
In explaining this last state interest, the Saikewicz court picked up
on the discussion begun in Quinlan regarding dissonance between a phy-
sician's own medical judgment and the prevailing standard of care, and
said that in this case, no such dissonance existed because "[riecognition
of the right to refuse treatment in appropriate circumstances is consistent
with existing medical mores." 91 In essence, the court told the physicians
involved in the Saikewicz case, as well as the medical profession in gen-
eral, that their professional integrity would not be compromised should
they honor a patient's wishes to decline treatment because they would
simply be following what was evolving into the prevailing medical
standard.92
89. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
90. Id. at 425.
91. Id at 426.
92. This same position was taken by the court in Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp.,
497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986). In Brophy, the wife of a patient in a persistent vegetative state
wanted to remove a gastrostomy tube that supplied her husband's nutrition and hydration.
The Massachusetts high court, following its own framework set out in Saikewicz, took note of
the need to balance individual concerns against potentially overriding state interests. Id at
635. The court held that removing Mr. Brophy's gastrostomy tube would not violate the integ-
rity of the medical profession because such a practice "is consistent with the view of sound
medical practice taken by the representative bodies of the American Medical Association, the
Massachusetts Medical Society, and that of many ethicists and physicians." Id at 638 (foot-
notes omitted). The Brophy court thus affirmed that a physician's professional integrity is
linked to a generalized standard of care rather than to his or her own moral and ethical values.
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Thus, the Saikewicz court sidestepped the more troubling question
of what a physician is to do when his or her own medical mores dictate a
different clinical outcome than that which the patient seeks, or that
which prevailing medical standards dictate. In essence, this is the quan-
dary in which the physicians caring for Helga Wanglie found themselves:
an internal tug-of-war between what prevailing medical standards re-
quire (continued aggressive care per the family's request) and conflicting
medical judgment, comprised in part of individual mores, about what
was in the best interest of the patient.
The benefit of hindsight makes clear that the Wanglie dilemma grew
from seeds planted in Saikewicz and other cases in which the courts were
asked to balance patient and physician autonomy. But instead of offering
guidance about how to resolve what proved to be an inevitable dilemma,
the Saikewicz court simply acknowledged that doctors do have a profes-
sional conscience that impacts on their medical decision making. But on
balance, the court said, "It is not necessary to deny a right of self-deter-
mination to a patient in order to recognize the interests of doctors, hospi-
tals, and medical personnel in attendance on the patient. '93
Following Saikewicz, courts confronted with right-to-refuse-treat-
ment cases often referred to the four state interests set out by the Massa-
chusetts court, including the interest in maintaining the ethical integrity
of the medical profession.94 But no court ever found this interest com-
pelling enough to override a patient's request, or even suggested that doc-
tor and patient autonomy could be viewed in parity. Instead, courts
generally found the patient's interest in medical self-determination so
compelling as to preclude a thorough balancing of individual and state
interests.95
93. 370 N.E.2d at 427.
94. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985) (noting the right to decline medical
treatment may, in some cases, yield to countervailing societal interests, and citing the four
interests set out in Saikewicz); accord Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980); In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984);
In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983). It is interesting to note that these courts considered
the state's interests relevant to the right to decline medical treatment, whether that right was
based on common-law doctrine (including the right to self-determination and informed con-
sent) or on constitutional theory (the right to privacy, based on state or federal constitutional
provisions or both). In either instance, these courts declared that the right to decline treat-
ment was not absolute and must be considered in light of possible countervailing state inter-
ests. See, e.g., Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1223.
95. For example, in Conroy, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether a naso-
gastric feeding tube could be removed from an 84-year-old incompetent nursing home resident
suffering from irreversible mental and physical ailments. In its discussion of the potential state
interests that would weigh against a patient's request for such action, the court said, "On
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Perhaps the strongest evidence of the low priority accorded the phy-
sician's professional conscience by courts can be seen in Cruzan. In
Cruzan, the Court highlighted the Saikewicz court's enunciation of the
four countervailing state interests that may be considered in treatment
refusal cases. The Court concluded that only one, the protection and
preservation of human life, was of import.96 Thus, it appears judicial
regard for, or even consideration of, a physician's moral and ethical con-
cerns surrounding treatment decisions will be absent so long as the pa-
tient requests treatment (or lack thereof) that comports with an
enunciated or evolving standard of medical practice.
B. The Common Law's Response to Assertions of Professional Conscience
When courts are called upon to resolve a clash at the bedside, they
inevitably must choose between honoring the values of the patient and
those of the doctor.97 To date, in most instances courts have deferred to
patients' values by honoring their treatment requests.98 But this is not to
say that courts have ignored the plight of physicians who express funda-
mental disagreement with a patient's wishes. In fact, courts generally
express empathy and concern for doctors and hospitals that, by virtue of
balance, the right to self-determination ordinarily outweighs any countervailing state inter-
ests." 486 A.2d at 1225.
96. The Court in Cruzan focused on the state's interest in preserving life to the exclusion
of the other three state interests outlined in Saikewicz. In the end, the Court held that a state
"may legitimately seek to safeguard the personal element of th[e] choice [between life and
death] through the imposition of heightened evidentiary requirements." 497 U.S. at 281.
97. While values are an integral part of decision making in any-context, they are para-
mount in reaching medical treatment decisions. Arguably, the values the patient and physi-
cian bring to the bedside are not similarly constituted. A patient's values may be comprised of
religious, sociologic, economic, and psychologic influences as well as a myriad of other consid-
erations. The values a physician brings to the bedside may be similarly derived, but will also
likely be based on experiences and training in the medical field. For a discussion of the role
personal values play in a physician's decision making, see SAMUEL GORovrrz, DocroRS'
DILEMMAS: MORAL CONFLICT AND MEDICAL CARE 98-111 (1982).
98. There have been numerous articles written about the rights of patients to refuse medi-
cal care. Recent additions include Thomas A. Eaton & Edward J. Larson, Experimenting
With The "Right to Die"In The Laboratory of the States, 25 GA. L. REv. 1253 (1991); Michael
R. Flick, The Due Process of Dying, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1121 (1991); Robertson, supra note 23.
Perhaps the best summary of the law in this area comes from the Court's opinion in Cruzan, in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist reviews the constitutional, statutory, and common-law under-
pinnings of the right to refuse treatment. In so doing, he points out that not all courts have
upheld treatment withdrawal requests by patients and their families. Citing In re O'Connor,
531 N.E.2d 607, 613-15 (N.Y. 1988), Chief Justice Rehnquist observes that the Court of Ap-
peals of New York, "over the objection of the patient's family members, granted an order to
insert a feeding tube into a 77-year-old [incompetent] woman .... The [New York] court held
that the record lacked the requisite clear and convincing evidence of the patient's expressed
intent to withhold life-sustaining treatment." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 274-75.
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judicial order, find themselves as stumbling blocks to their patient's de-
sired outcome. In those instances in which a doctor refuses to continue
treating a patient or declines to withdraw treatment, courts have strug-
gled to accommodate the values of both doctor and patient.
(1) The Physician's Right to Abandon a Patient Who Desires Continued
Treatment
In all likelihood, every doctor has encountered a "difficult" pa-
tient--one who is noncompliant or uncooperative, or whose behavior ex-
ceeds the doctor's level of tolerance. When such a mismatch occurs, a
doctor may attempt to dismiss the patient, abdicating further responsibil-
ity for the patient's care. While this may seem a callous response, the
law permits a physician to abandon a patient so long as that physician
provides due notice and an ample opportunity for the patient "to secure
the presence of other medical attendance." 99
This common-law principle permitting physician abandonment was
tested to the limit in Payton v. Weaver.100 In that case, a physician spe-
cializing in kidney problems, Dr. John C. Weaver, attempted over the
course of nearly four years to dismiss Brenda Payton, a patient described
as exhibiting " 'persistent uncooperative and antisocial behavior ... [in-
cluding] the use of barbiturates and other illicit drugs.' "101 Dr. Weaver
began treating Ms. Payton in 1975, but after three years of" 'persistent
refusal to adhere to reasonable constraints of hemodialysis,'" he in-
formed her by letter dated December 12, 1978 that he would no longer
permit her to receive dialysis at the hospital with which he was affili-
ated.10 2 After this warning, Dr. Weaver continued to treat Ms. Payton
on an emergency basis, although he sent repeated letters asserting that he
no longer wished to treat her on a long-term basis. With his written
notifications of dismissal, he included a list of dialysis providers in the
99. Payton v. Weaver, 182 Cal. Rptr. 225, 229 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (quoting Lathrope v.
Flood, 63 P. 1007, 1008, rev'd on other grounds, 67 P. 683 (Cal. 1902). Accord Miller v.
Greater Southeast Community Hosp., 508 A.2d 927, 929 (D.C. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that
supplying noncritical patient with a list of substitute physicians to replace attending physician
is reasonable means of severing professional relationship); Lyons v. Grether, 239 S.E.2d 103,
106 (Va. 1977) (holding physician has right to withdraw from case, provided patient is given
reasonable opportunity to acquire needed services from another physician). To clarify, this
policy generally applies when a medically stable patient desires continued care, but the physi-
cian is unwilling to provide care to that patient. As the court in Payton points out, such a
policy may not apply when the patient is in need of emergency care. See 182 Cal. Rptr. at 229-
30.
100. 182 Cal. Rptr. at 229.
101. Id. at 227 (quoting letter from Dr. Weaver to Mrs. Payton).
102. Id.
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area and volunteered to help her find alternative care. Ms. Payton re-
sponded by filing a petition for mandate to compel Dr. Weaver to pro-
vide her with outpatient dialysis services. 10 3
At trial, the court denied Ms. Payton's petition, holding she had no
legal right to compel medical services from Dr. Weaver. But at the same
time the trial court imposed a temporary order requiring the doctor to
provide treatment to Ms. Payton on a regular basis pending appeal. 1°4
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's finding
that Dr. Weaver acted reasonably, and commended him for behaving
"according to the highest standards of the medical profession."10 5 The
court also empathized with both the physician's dilemma and the pa-
tient's crisis, saying the case "challenge[d] the ability of the law, and
society, to cope effectively and sensitively with fundamental problems of
human existence."10 6
Ultimately, the court upheld the trial court's finding that Dr.
Weaver had no long-term duty to care for the plaintiff. The court em-
phasized that "there exists no basis in law or in equity to saddle [Dr.
Weaver] with a continuing sole obligation for Brenda's welfare." 107 Af-
ter suggesting several alternatives that could assist the plaintiff, including
involuntary or voluntary conservatorship, the court released Dr. Weaver
from further responsibility, despite a last minute plea from Ms. Payton's
attorneys to order the doctor to provide dialysis "'until he can, by use of
his resources, arrange for an orderly transfer to another physician.' "108
The court refused this request.109
What seems most compelling about Payton v. Weaver is not what the
court did, but rather what the court refused to do. Faced with what it
perceived to be a no-win situation, the court anguished over which party
should be made to suffer, the doctor or the patient. In the end, the court
103. Id.
104. Id. at 228-29. Ms. Payton also named as defendants two hospitals that refused to
treat her in late 1978 after she received the letter of dismissal from Dr. Weaver. The trial court
did not order these hospitals to accept the plaintiff as a patient because she was not in need of
emergency treatment. The court cited to the California Health and Safety Code section 1317,
which provides in relevant part: "Emergency services and care shall be provided to any person
requesting such services or care, or for whom such services or care is requested, for any condi-
tion in which the person is in danger of loss of life, or serious injury or illness, at any health
facility licensed under this chapter that maintains and operates an emergency department
.... " Id. at 229.
105. Id
106. Id at 226.
107. Id
108. Id at 231 n.4.
109. Id
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felt the doctor had acted in the utmost good faith and absolved him of
any further involvement with this difficult patient. One wonders what
harm, or more aptly what additional harm, would have befallen Dr.
Weaver had he been ordered to facilitate the transfer of his former pa-
tient to another physician. Surely a physician is in a better position than
a patient, particularly an ailing patient, to access information about the
existence and qualifications of other physicians. This assumption may be
especially true when the search is for a doctor in the same area of exper-
tise as the treating physician.
Admittedly, a system that relies on doctors to, in effect, "sell" a
difficult patient to another doctor, is problematic, 110 but at least such a
system shows respect for both the physician and the patient. An order
that a physician or hospital facilitate the transfer of a dismissed patient
assures that the patient will not be abandoned without vital medical care,
while at the same time according deference to the physician's profes-
sional conscience. Given the choice between continuing to treat a patient
with whose treatment choices a physician fundamentally disagrees, and
facilitating the transfer of that patient, it seems likely the physician
would choose the latter option. Presumably, an action against one's con-
science is more burdensome than any actions toward facilitation of a pa-
tient's transfer.
While the facts in Payton v. Weaver may suggest that courts are un-
willing to engage physicians in a search for their replacements, this un-
willingness is apparently limited to situations in which a patient seeks
continued care. In cases in which patients request withdrawal of treat-
ment, primarily life-sustaining treatment, and encounter an unwilling
doctor or hospital, courts have almost universally ordered the health care
provider to either accede to the patient's wishes or facilitate the transfer
of the patient to another provider who is willing to comply with the pa-
tient's request.
(2) The Physician's Duty to Transfer a Patient Desiring Treatment
Withdrawal
While the law permits a physician to abandon, with proper notice, a
patient who seeks nonemergency care, I11 it is more imposing on doctors
110. See infra text accompanying notes 124-131 for a discussion of the problems with
court orders to transfer care of patients whose doctors refuse to honor their treatment requests.
111. The issue of a physician's duty to treat those in need of emergency care is an interest-
ing one, but also beyond the scope of this Article. For a good discussion of the legal duty to
provide emergency care, see Karen H. Rothenberg, Who Cares?. The Evolution of the Legal
Duty to Provide Emergency Care, 26 Hous. L. REV. 21 (1989).
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who refuse to comply with a patient's wishes to terminate treatment.
When a court decides that a patient's right to self-determination includes
the right to demand that treatment be discontinued, it must also decide
how to best achieve this desired outcome. Essentially a court has two
choices in these situations: It can order the doctor or treating health care
facility to transfer the patient to another facility that is willing to uphold
the patient's request, or it can order the doctor to comply with the pa-
tient's request, and thus put aside his or her moral, ethical or professional
objections to terminating treatment. Both options have been exercised by
the courts, and both are problematic.
a. Court Orders To Transfer a Patient for Termination of Treatment
The fact that a patient has the right to refuse continued medical
treatment does not give rise to a concomitant physician duty to discon-
tinue care upon request. This principle is illustrated by Conservatorship
of Morrison v. Abramovice,112 a case in which the daughter of a ninety-
year-old woman in a persistent vegetative state sought removal of a naso-
gastric feeding tube from her mother. The hospital physicians refused
the daughter's request due to what the court called "personal moral ob-
jections." 113 In tackling this case, the court first held that a patient, as
well as a patient's surrogate decision maker, has the right to reject a phy-
sician's recommendation. In this case, that meant Mrs. Morrison's
daughter could lawfully authorize removal of the tube.114
The next question the court faced was whether a patient or surro-
gate can require a physician to comply with a treatment request against
the physician's personal moral objections. The court answered this ques-
tion by holding:
The prevailing viewpoint among medical ethicists appears to be that a
physician has the right to refuse on personal moral grounds to follow a
conservator's direction to withhold life-sustaining treatment, but must
be willing to transfer the patient to another physician who will follow
the conservator's direction.115
112. 253 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
113. IM. at 534. The court's summary of the facts of the case states only that the patient's
daughter, who was also appointed as her conservator, requested removal of the feeding tube,
and the hospital refused her request. At trial, both the hospital medical director and the at-
tending physician testified they had personal objections to removing the patient's feeding tube.
Based on this testimony, the court framed the issue in the case as follows: "Can a conservator
require physicians to remove a nasogastric tube against their personal moral objections?" Id.
114. Id. at 533-34.
115. Id. at 534 (citing JONSEN, supra note 56, at 104). The court also supported this
proposition with the ethical principles and guidelines developed by a joint committee of the
Los Angeles County Medical and Bar Associations that provide: "'A physician has the right
to refuse to participate in continuing or foregoing life-sustaining treatment. In exercising this
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This solution to transfer the patient is one that seems to meet the needs
of both the patient and the physician and has been adopted in a variety of
cases. For example, in Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital,1 6 after
finding that the patient's surrogate had the right to authorize treatment
withdrawal, the court made clear that this right did not justify compel-
ling medical professionals to take active measures that were contrary to
their view of the ethical duty owed their patients. 17 The Brophy court
ordered the hospital to assist the patient's guardian in transferring the
patient to a suitable facility."1 " Mr. Brophy was transferred to another
hospital where feeding was discontinued. He died eight days later.' 19
It seems courts believe this transfer approach is fair and just, as do
several medical ethics panels. For example, the American Medical Asso-
ciation, in a recent pronouncement about the care of patients in a persis-
tent vegetative state, stated such patients or their surrogates have the
right to demand that treatment be withheld or withdrawn.120 The AMA
acknowledged that situations may arise in which a physician is person-
ally opposed to participating in the requested discontinuance of care. In
right, however, the physician must transfer the care of the patient to another qualified physi-
cian.' " Id. at 534 (citing COMMITTEE ON BIOMEDICAL ETHICS OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION & Los ANGELES COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES AND
GUIDELINES CONCERNING THE FOREGOING OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT FOR ADULT
PATIENTS, 2 (1986)). The joint committee revised these guidelines in 1990. The section re-
garding a physician's right to refuse treatment states:
Should the patient or patient's surrogate choose a course of action that would violate
the ethical or religious beliefs of the physician, the physician may generally decline to
participate in that course of action, where another physician who is willing to be
guided by the patient's wishes will accept care of the patient. In so doing, however,
the physician declining to participate must cooperate in transfer of the care of the
patient to a new physician.
COMMITTEE ON BIOMEDICAL ETHICS OF Los ANGELES COUNTY MEDICAL ASSOCIATION &
Los ANGELES COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATIONS, GUIDELINES FOR FORGOING LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT FOR ADULT PATIENTS, 4-5 (1990). In its revised 1990 guidelines, the joint com-
mittee seems to remove some of the burden of transferring the patient from the attending
physician. Instead of requiring the declining physician to transfer the patient to another quali-
fied physician, the committee now urges the withdrawing physician to simply "cooperate" in
the transfer to a new physician. Perhaps this revision reflects the committee's appreciation of
the difficulty physicians and hospitals face when trying to transfer a patient based on an asser-
tion of professional conscience. For a discussion of the realities of such transfers, see infra text
accompanying notes 124-131.
116. 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986).
117. Id. at 639.
118. Id. at 639-40.
119. See George J. Annas, Transferring the Ethical Hot Potato, 17 HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Feb. 1987, at 20-21.
120. See Council on Scientific Affairs and Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Persis-
tent Vegetative State and the Decision to Withdraw or Withhold Life Support, 263 JAMA 426
(1990) [hereinafter Persistent Vegetative State].
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those cases, the AMA states that "the physician should transfer the pa-
tient to a physician who is willing to carry out the decision." 121 Interest-
ingly, the AMA does not state this same instruction with respect to a
patient's request for continued care that the physician opposes. In fact,
the AMA does not address what a physician should do in this situation.
It does, however, assert early in its policy statement that "caretakers
have no legal duty to prolong life when treatment will not restore con-
sciousness or produce other medically definable benefits."' 122
Perhaps the AMA's silence in guiding physicians opposed to contin-
uing treatment, coupled with its assertion that doctors have no legal duty
to continue medically futile care, is a recognition that the transfer solu-
tion is the best one current medicolegal jurisprudence offers to physicians
who face patient opposition at either end of the treatment continuum.
That is, even if one accepts the proposition that a doctor has no legal
duty to render futile care, the entrenched principle that a physician may
not abandon a patient without providing appropriate backup remains.1 23
Thus, even if no duty to render care exists, a doctor would breach his or
her duty not to abandon a patient if he or she both refused to provide
care and refused to transfer the patient to another physician.
What the AMA policy seems to recognize is that a physician may
refuse to provide what he or she feels is futile medical care, so long as the
patient is transferred to another physician who either disagrees about the
characterization of treatment or who is otherwise willing to provide care.
Given judicial as well as private endorsement of patient transfer, a pre-
liminary if not primary inquiry should explore whether such transfer is a
viable option for most physicians and hospitals. If the ability to transfer
a patient to another treating physician is more of an aspiration than a
reality, then it is time for courts and policy makers to reevaluate their
position on the clash at the bedside.
b. The Realities of Patient Transfer
Court orders and policies that call for a physician to facilitate the
transfer of a patient to another provider carry the theoretical benefit of
accommodating two conflicting interests, those of the patient and the
physician. This benefit could be said to inure both in cases in which a
patient seeks continued or additional care, and in cases in which patients
request treatment withdrawal. But what are the realities of such transfer
mandates? The medical staff caring for Helga Wanglie attempted to
121. Id. at 429. In reaching this recommendation, the AMA cites Brophy.
122. Id at 426.
123. See supra text accompanying note 99.
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transfer her to another facility after providing what it considered to be
inappropriate care for many months. Despite intensive efforts to effectu-
ate her transfer and generous insurance for her care, no provider would
accept Mrs. Wanglie.124
A similar fate befell William Bartling, a seventy-year-old man suffer-
ing from chronic respiratory failure, in his quest to have his respirator
disconnected.125  When Mr. Bartling asked that his life-sustaining
breathing machine be removed, the hospital refused on the grounds that
it was a "Christian, pro-life oriented hospital, the majority of whose doc-
tors would view disconnecting a life-support system ... as inconsistent
with the healing orientation of physicians." 126 Instead of simply dis-
missing Mr. Bartling's request, the hospital attempted to strike a com-
promise between their position and that of the patient by trying to locate
another hospital that would accept Mr. Bartling as a patient.1 27 This
effort was unsuccessful, and Mr. Bartling died in the same hospital
tethered to a respirator.12 8
The cases of Helga Wanglie and William Bartling are likely repre-
sentative of a host of instances in which hospitals and individual physi-
cians have attempted to transfer patients who they perceive to be "ethical
hot potatoes." 129 Once so classified, the reality of these patients' transfer
becomes a near impossibility.
124. See Steven H. Miles, Interpersonal Issues in the Wanglie Case, 2 KENNEDY INSTI-
TUTE OF ETHICS J. 61 (1992). In his personal description of the Wanglie case, Dr. Miles
recounts that the Wanglie family believed the hospital, on the Wanglie family's demand, had a
duty to provide whatever care the insurer would pay for, and therefore refused the hospital's
offers to transfer Mrs. Wanglie. Id. at 69 n.1. The hospitals made such offers in August 1990,
November 1990 and January 1991. Id. In March 1991, a week before the original trial date,
the family asked for time to transfer her. Over the next five weeks, the hospital worked with
members of the right-to-life community to identify a provider. Dr. Miles reports that no pro-
vider would accept Mrs. Wanglie as a patient. Id. at 69 n.1.
125. See Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal.Ct. App. 1984).
126. Id. at 225.
127. Id. at 225 n.7.
128. See id. at 221. Although the court does not explicitly say Mr. Bartling died while
connected to the respirator, it does report he passed away the afternoon before the Court of
Appeal hearing on the Bartling's petition challenging the denial of their request for an injunc-
tion ordering the hospital to disconnect the respirator. The Court of Appeal held that the
court below erred in denying injunctive relief. Id. at 227.
129. This term is borrowed from George J. Annas, supra note 119. In his article, Profes-
sor Annas argues hospitals are corporations incapable of having either "moral" or "ethical
objections" to actions. He argues physicians derive their authority to practice medicine from
the state (in the form of licensing), and their patients (in the form of consent) and therefore
have no independent "right" to treat patients. Id. at 21. Thus, he seems to suggest neither
hospitals nor physicians have the right to object to patient choices on the grounds of profes-
sional conscience, and their actions must be guided strictly by principles of patient self-deter-
mination. It seems to me that doctors, as independent moral agents, have both the capacity
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At least some courts are aware of the difficulty of transferring pa-
tients whose treatment wishes contravene those of their health care prov-
iders. In Conservatorship of Morrison, the court acknowledged this
difficulty when it held that "no physician should be forced to act against
his or her personal moral beliefs if the patient can be transferred to the
care of another physician who will follow the [patient's] direction." 130
Since transfer of the patient did not appear to be a problem in the Morri-
son case, 31 the court did not need to reach the difficult question of how
to handle a case in which no provider can be found that will follow the
patient's direction to withdraw treatment. In those cases, courts have
generally sympathized with the patient's plight and ordered physician
compliance.
c. Court Orders to Comply with Patient Wishes for Withdrawal of
Treatment
Several courts facing the likelihood of a futile hunt for patient place-
ment have opted instead to order providers to comply with the patient's
wishes. For example, in In re Jobes,1 32 the husband of Nancy Jobes, a
nursing home patient in a persistent vegetative state, sought a court order
authorizing the withdrawal of a jejunostomy tube, 133 which provided
Nancy with nutrition and hydration. The facility had refused the hus-
band's request on "moral grounds." 134 The trial court held that Mr.
Jobes could authorize removal of the tube, but the nursing home was
entitled to refuse to participate in the withdrawal and could keep Mrs.
Jobes connected to the tube until she was transferred out of the
facility.135
and the right to express their own moral and ethical objections to patient choices, as do institu-
tions through their enunciated policies and guidelines. Instead of downplaying or ignoring the
professional conscience of the health care provider, we should recognize its existence and ac-
knowledge the important role it plays in the clinical setting. Only in this way can doctors and
patients work toward resolving their conflicting choices of conscience.
130. 253 Cal. Rptr. at 534 (emphasis added).
131. The hospital that cared for Mrs. Morrison, Laguna Honda Hospital, is a public facil-
ity. Its administrators told Mrs. Childs, Mrs. Morrison's daughter, that it would transfer her
mother at government expense to any suitable facility that would accede to her wishes. Id.
Shortly after the court of appeal decided the case, Mrs. Morrison was transferred to a private
hospital where her feeding tube was withdrawn. She died a few days later. Telephone Inter-
view with John R. Weinstein, counsel for Louise Childs (Sept. 18, 1992).
132. 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987).
133. A jejunostomy is defined as an "operative establishment of an opening from the ab-
dominal wall into the jejunum." STEDMAN'S MED. DICTIONARY 736 (illustrated 5th unabr.
lawyers' ed. 1982). The jejunum is the portion of small intestine between the duodenum and
the ileum. IM Thus, a jejunostomy tube is a tube placed directly into the jejunum.
134. 529 A.2d at 437.
135. I1 "[Tihe [trial] court found that Mr. Jobes had proved by clear and convincing
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The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the portion of the trial
court's opinion allowing the nursing home to refuse to participate in the
withdrawal of treatment. 136 In so doing, the court highlighted the diffi-
culty involved in securing another facility to carry out the patient's re-
quest. It noted, "The evidence indicates that at this point it would be
extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to find another facility that would
accept Mrs. Jobes as a patient."' 137 The court therefore held that to allow
the nursing home to discharge Mrs. Jobes if her family does not consent
to continued artificial feeding would frustrate the patient's right of self-
determination. 38 In the end, the court ordered the nursing home to par-
ticipate in the withdrawal of Mrs. Jobes's feeding tube and, simultane-
ously, to provide for her comfort and dignity. 139
In Jobes, the court was keenly aware that it had to choose between
patient autonomy and physician autonomy,' 4° and that whatever deci-
sion it made would impinge on the rights of the nonprevailing party. In
fact, the court acknowledged "that our decision will be burdensome for
some of the nursing home personnel."' 141 Nevertheless, the court con-
cluded, "[I1n view of the immense hardship that would fall on Mrs. Jobes
evidence that his wife was in a persistent vegetative state with no prospect of improvement,
and that, if competent, she would not want to be sustained by the [jejunostomy] tube under her
present circumstances." Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the trial
court on slightly different grounds. It found although there was some "trustworthy" evidence
that Mrs. Jobes would have wanted the feeding tube withdrawn, it was not sufficiently "clear
and convincing." Id. at 443. The court then adopted the "substituted judgment" approach
that allows surrogate decision makers, such as a patient's family member, close friend, or
court-appointed guardian, to make a substituted medical judgment for the patient based on the
patient's prior expressed values. Id. at 444. For a more in-depth discussion of the substituted
judgment approach adopted by the Jobes court, see id. at 444-47.




140. Physician autonomy, as used here, can also include the ability of the health care
facility to assert and enforce its policy toward withdrawal of artificial feeding. The Jobes court
indicated that it was balancing the right of the patient's family to exercise Mrs. Jobes's right to
self-determination against the nursing home's right to assert a policy that precludes with-
drawal of feeding tubes. In this case, the court found that the facility had not informed Mrs.
Jobes's family about its policy until May 1985 when they requested that the tube be with-
drawn. Under these circumstances, said the court, Mrs. Jobes and her family were entitled to
rely on the nursing home's willingness to defer to their choices among courses of medical
treatment, presumably including the choice to discontinue feeding. 529 A.2d at 450. Later, in
dicta, the court said that it was not deciding a case in which a nursing home gave notice of its
policy not to participate in the withdrawal or withholding of artificial feeding at the time of the
patient's admission. The court simply said, "we do not hold that such a policy is never en-
forceable," id., leaving open the possibility that a facility could, under certain circumstances,
lawfully refuse to participate in a patient's decision to forgo treatment.
141. Id.
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and her family if she were forced out of the nursing home, we are com-
pelled to impose on [the nursing home personnel] for her continued
care."9142
The court in Jobes was not the first and probably will not be the last
to conclude patient autonomy must override a physician's or an institu-
tion's professional conscience, even when such a conclusion places a bur-
den on the health care workers forced to participate in a treatment plan
they find offensive. 143 Given the difficult reality of doctor-assisted patient
transfer 144 and the impropriety of patient abandonment, courts may be-
lieve compelling a health care worker to honor a patient's treatment
wishes is, on balance, the least harmful alternative. After all, a court
may reason, ordering a physician to render treatment is nothing more
than requiring that the physician fulfill the professional duties he or she
has committed to undertake.1 45 Alternatively, ordering a physician to
participate in the withdrawal of treatment may be viewed as a natural
extension of the principle of patient autonomy. Such orders may also be
viewed as a necessity because physicians are uniquely qualified to provide
for the comfort and dignity of patients who chose to forgo life-sustaining
treatment. 146
Whatever the rationale, it seems that leaving courts, hospitals or
doctors with an all-or-nothing remedy-ie., comply or transfer-does
not satisfy the goals of patient or physician autonomy. Forcing a dying
patient to leave a setting that has become familiar, if not comforting,
seems nonsensical at best; such a change would likely be emotionally and
psychologically devastating to patients and their families. 147 On the
142. Id.
143. For example, in Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 583 (D.R.I. 1988), the court
upheld the right of an unconscious patient's husband to authorize removal of his wife's feeding
tube over the "adamant opposition" of the health care personnel caring for her. In addition,
the court ordered the medical center to accede to the patient's request (as made through her
husband) "if [she] cannot be promptly transferred to a health care facility that will respect her
wishes." Id. at 591; see also In re Requena, 517 A.2d 869, 870 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1986) (ordering hospital to comply with patient's informed decision to withdraw treatment
even though it presented an alternative hospital 17 miles away that was willing to acquiesce in
patient's decision).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 124-131.
145. Of course, this reasoning fails if one believes a physician is under no duty to furnish
treatment that provides no medical benefit to the patient. See supra text accompanying notes
51-64 for a discussion of definitions of beneficial treatment.
146. Physicians are uniquely qualified because they are able to prescribe pain medications
that can ease the dying process. This statement was not intended to ignore or downplay the
essential role nurses and other health care workers play in aiding patients and their families
through this terribly painful experience.
147. In In re Requena, a woman sought to compel a hospital to comply with her request
for treatment withdrawal. The hospital refused and offered to transfer the patient to a nearby
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other hand, forcing doctors to comply with a patient's wishes they find
morally, ethically, religiously, or professionally offensive is an equally
unsatisfactory result. 148 Any solution to this dilemma must attempt to
accommodate the competing interests of doctors and patients. A solu-
tion should strive to keep patients at the site where they have received
care, but not force doctors to act against their professional conscience.
I. Statutory Schemes Upholding a Physician's Rightto Self-
Determination
While courts seem unable or perhaps unwilling to weigh an individ-
ual physician's concerns about the moral and ethical implications of ac-
commodating a patient's right to self-determination, legislatures in a
variety of states have sought to protect a physician's right to self-determi-
nation in certain situations. Specifically, legislatures appear sensitive to a
physician's desire to exercise moral choice in two instances. First, many
states accord doctors, as well as other health care personnel, the right to
refuse to participate in an abortion. Second, a few recently enacted stat-
utes provide that a physician shall not be required to render medical
treatment that the physician determines is medically or ethically inappro-
priate. By exploring these two statutory schemes, one senses that con-
comitant accommodation of patient and physician autonomy can be a
reality.
A. A Physician's Right to Refuse to Participate in Abortion
The vast majority of states in this country have enacted legislation
permitting physicians to refuse to participate in an abortion.1 49 Typi-
hospital that was willing to comply. The court noted the patient did not want to leave the
facility because "she finds assurance in the familiar surroundings and the familiar nursing and
professional personnel who have been taking care of her." In re Requena, 517 A.2d at 870.
Also, the court concluded that moving the dying patient to another hospital "would be a hard
psychological and emotional blow to her." Id.
148. It may also be a result that would be prohibited under the law pertaining to specific
enforcement of personal service contracts. To the extent a physician's services can be viewed
as personal services, the common-law rule, codified in many states, provides that an obligation
to render personal services cannot be specifically enforced. See 5A ARTHUR L. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1204 (1962); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3390 (West 1992). Under this
principle, a doctor could not be ordered to provide continued care even if the patient alleged an
existing obligation to render care. This result, of course, does not mean other remedies are not
available to a patient whose doctor refuses to render care.
149. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010(b) (1991); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2151 (1991);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-601(a) (Michie 1992); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25955
(Deering 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-104 (West 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24,
§ 1791 (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(8) (West 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-21-142
(1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 453-16(d) (1991); IDAHO CODE § 18-612 (1991); ILL. ANN. STAT.
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cally, these statutes provide that no person shall be required to perform
or participate in medical procedures that result in the termination of a
pregnancy. They further provide that a person's refusal to participate in
an abortion shall not be the basis for civil liability or other recriminatory
action. 150 In most states, the laws do not require physicians or other
health care workers to provide any reason for refusing to participate in
an abortion. The statutes simply state that a person may refuse to par-
ticipate in an abortion, implying no explanation is necessary. 151
ch. 38, para. 81-33(13) (Smith-Hurd 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-10-3-2 (Bums 1991); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 146.1 (West 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-443 (1990); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 311.800 (Baldwin 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299.31 (West 1991); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 1591 (West 1991); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-214 (1988); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 121 (Law. Co-op. 1992); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.20182
(West 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.42 (West 1991); Mo. REV. STAT. § 197.032(1) (1990);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111 (1992); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-337 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 632.475 (Michie 1991); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:65A-3 (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-
5-2 (Michie 1991); N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 79-i (Consol. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
45.1(e) (1991); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.91 (Baldwin 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 1-741(B) (West 1991); OR. REv. STAT. § 435.475 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11
(1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-50 (Law. Co-op. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-
23A-13 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-204 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306 (1992);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2-75 (Michie 1991); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.02 (Initiative Measure
No. 120) (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 140-42 (1990); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-105 (1992). These
statutes also generally exempt nurses, technicians, and other hospital employees.
Federal law also recognizes the right of federally funded health care workers to decline to
participate in an abortion if doing so would be contrary to their religious beliefs or moral
convictions. See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b) (1988).
150. For example, the Delaware Medical Practices Act provides:
No person shall be required to perform or participate in medical procedures which
result in the termination of pregnancy; and the refusal of any person to perform or
participate in these medical procedures shall not be a basis for civil liability to any
person, nor a basis for any disciplinary or other recriminatory action against him.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1791(a) (1991). This statute, as well as a majority of those cited in
note 149, supra, also contain language that permits a hospital to refuse to participate in an
abortion. In fact, the only states that do not explicitly permit hospitals to refuse to participate
in an abortion are Louisiana and South Dakota. In Kentucky, Oklahoma, Utah, Washington,
and Wyoming, the institutional right to refuse is expressly limited to private hospitals. See
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800(3) (Baldwin 1991); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741(A) (1992);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306(2) (1992) (exempts private or denominational hospitals or
both); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.02 (Initiative Measure No. 120) (1992); Wyo. STAT. § 35-
6-105 (1992).
151. These statutes stand in contrast to the common law, discussed supra in the text ac-
companying notes 132-146, which generally requires that a physician who refuses to perform a
patient's treatment requests must transfer the patient to another doctor who will abide by the
patient's wishes. In no state does the abortion refusal law require or even suggest that an
objecting physician transfer the patient to another physician or facility. At most, the statute
may require that the physician notify the patient of his or her objection. See ILL. REV. STAT.




In contrast, a few states require doctors' refusals to participate in an
abortion to be founded on some moral or religious ground. 152 By impos-
ing these rationale parameters, as amorphous as they are, these states
appear to be trying to protect patients against arbitrary refusals to treat.
Perhaps the state legislators worried that an unwanted pregnancy could
raise questions in the physician's mind about the patient's morality, caus-
ing the physician to refuse to abort the fetus in an effort to impose his or
her own judgments about the patient's lifestyle. 153
Whatever the reason for requiring physicians to provide a particular
basis for opting out of performing an abortion, the evidentiary threshold
for proving a moral or religious objection is so minimal as to be nonexis-
tent. The statutes do not require the physician to provide any evidence
of a religious affiliation; they merely state a doctor shall not be required
to perform an abortion if he or she objects on moral or religious grounds.
Consequently, it seems that most states allow physicians to exercise their
professional conscience in dealing with these patients.154
By analogy, it seems that our jurisprudence should accept a physi-
cian's assertion of professional conscience in settings other than abortion.
If the law permits a physician to opt out of treating a pregnant patient
152. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2151 (1991) (objection shall be on moral or
religious grounds); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25955(a) (Deering 1992) (person must
indicate moral, ethical, or religious basis for refusal); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-104
(West 1991) (moral or religious grounds); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-21-142 (1991) (same); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-33(13) (1991) (no physician shall be required against his or her
conscience); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 121 (Law. Co-op. 1992) (moral or religious
objections); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111(2) (1992) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 75(1)
(Michie 1991) (moral, ethical, or religious basis for objection); VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2-75
(Michie 1991) (personal, ethical, moral, or religious grounds); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 140-42(1)
(West 1990) (moral or religious grounds).
The foregoing state statutes also require a physician's objection to participating in an
abortion to be stated in writing. Two other states, Idaho and South Carolina, also require that
a physician's refusal to participate in an abortion be in writing, but do not require a physician
to give a specific reason for his or her refusal. In both states, the statutory language provides
written notice that a physician objects to performing an abortion "will suffice without specifi-
cation of the reason therefor." See IDAHO CODE § 18-612 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-
50(a) (Law. Co-op.1990).
153. For example, a physician seeing a pregnant unwed teenager seeking her fourth abor-
tion in two years could decide the only way the young girl will learn to practice birth control
would be to "suffer the consequences" of the failure to use contraceptives. In that case, the
physician's refusal to perform the abortion would not be grounded on his or her own moral or
religious beliefs, but rather on a judgment about the morality of the patient.
154. In Illinois, the notion of a professional conscience is written into the abortion statute.
Section 81-33(13) of the Abortion Law of 1975 provides: "No physician, hospital, ambulatory
surgical center, nor employee thereof, shall be required against his or its conscience declared in
writing to perform, permit or participate in any abortion .. " ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
81-33(13) (1991).
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seeking an abortion for moral, religious, or in most cases no stated rea-
son, why shouldn't that same right exist when the patient is in a persis-
tent vegetative state seeking ventilator support?
On the surface, the answer to this question might be that in one
instance a physician is objecting to ending a potential life, while in the
other a physician is objecting to providing for or maintaining an existing
life, a concept far more objectionable. At the heart of both situations,
however, is a doctor who is disinclined to carry out the wishes of the
patient because of some deeply held personal convictions. These convic-
tions are likely as strong and heartfelt when dealing with a terminally ill
patient as they are in the abortion setting. To the extent the law ac-
knowledges and respects these convictions in one medical setting, it
should likewise accommodate them in others. Legislative efforts to ex-
pand a physician's right to refuse to provide treatment are underway, but
the gap between protections afforded in the abortion setting and those
provided in other medical settings remains wide.
B. Legislative Efforts to Protect a Physician's Professional Conscience
Outside the Abortion Setting
In 1976, when the New Jersey Supreme Court handed down its deci-
sion in In re Quinlan,155 setting forth the common law basis for a pa-
tient's right to refuse treatment, state legislators in California were also
debating the complexity of this issue. What emerged from this debate
was the California Natural Death Act, the nation's first statute giving
terminally ill patients the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. 156
Since that time, virtually every state has enacted legislation designed to
address the needs of patients and their surrogates who seek removal of
life-sustaining treatment.1 57 As in the case of courts that grapple with
patients' rights issues, legislative attention to the concerns of the treating
physician has been slight, but perceptible.
Legislative schemes for upholding a patient's right to refuse treat-
ment come in essentially three forms: (1) "living will" or "natural
death" laws which establish a written method for people to specify their
own wishes about the use of artificial life support; (2) "health care agent"
or "durable power of attorney for health care" laws which allow individ-
155. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
156. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7185.5 (West 1991).
157. See SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, REFUSAL OF TREATMENT LEGISLATION
(1991). According to this 50-state survey, the only states that do not have legislation dealing
specifically with medical decision making are Nebraska and Pennsylvania. Id.
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uals to appoint someone to make decisions about the use of life-sus-
taining treatment for them; and (3) "surrogate decision-making"
provisions which delineate the individuals who are empowered to make
decisions on behalf of an incompetent patient who has not executed any
document.158 In addition to spelling out a patient's right to direct his or
her own care, many of these statutes also provide guidance in the event
the health care provider does not want to honor a patient or surrogate's
instruction. For example, the Oregon Directive to Physicians Act pro-
vides that a physician who refuses to comply with a terminally ill pa-
tient's request for withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment shall "[m]ake a
reasonable effort to locate a physician or medical facility that will give
effect to a qualified patient's directive and shall have a duty to transfer
the qualified patient to that physician or facility." 159 This transfer solu-
tion is the typical legislative approach to the problem of physician refusal
to comply with patient wishes.16°
Like the abortion refusal laws, the treatment refusal laws do not
require a physician to state a specific reason for declining to follow a
patient's wishes. Unlike the abortion laws, however, patients' rights stat-
utes do not explicitly permit physicians to refuse patient requests. At
most, they sometimes provide that a doctor will not be held criminally or
civilly liable for failing to follow a patient's written directive. 16
Thus, unlike abortion refusal laws, treatment refusal statutes do not
give physicians a statutory right to exercise their professional conscience.
Instead, they provide a patient with the statutory right to demand treat-
ment withdrawal while imposing on a physician the statutory duty to
find another physician willing to follow the patient's wishes.
One notable characteristic of most treatment refusal laws is that
they only address the situation of a patient who wishes to decline treat-
158. Id. at 1.
159. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.625(3)(a) (1991).
160. See, e.g., Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-113
(1990) (attending physician who refuses to comply with declaration shall transfer patient to
another physician who is willing to comply); Texas Natural Death Act, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. § 672.016 (1990) (physician who refuses to comply with patient wishes shall make "rea-
sonable effort" to transfer patient).
161. See, for example, Nevada Withholding or Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Procedures
Act, NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.640 (1991), providing: "No hospital or other medical facility,
physician, or person working under the direction of a physician is subject to criminal or civil
liability for failure to follow the directions of the patient to withhold or withdraw life-sus-
taining procedures." Colorado takes a different approach to physician refusal, providing:
"Refusal of an attending physician to comply with a declaration and failure to transfer the care
of the declarant to another physician shall constitute unprofessional conduct as defined in
section 12-36-117, C.R.S." Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act, COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 15-18-113(5) (1990).
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ment. What about a patient, like Helga Wanglie, who demands contin-
ued care in the face of physician objection? Natural death and living will
statutes do not tell a physician that he or she may refuse to treat a pa-
tient, only that he or she may not decline to discontinue treatment of a
patient. Does this statutory silence mean that physicians have no pro-
tected right to refuse to provide what they consider inappropriate or fu-
tile care to a patient? If so, is this issue something our state legislatures
should be concerned about?
At least one state has enacted legislation which recognizes that a
physician has a professional conscience that can be offended by certain
treatment requests. The Virginia legislature recently amended its Natu-
ral Death Act, 162 which sets out patients' rights to make decisions about
their health care, including the right to make an advance directive au-
thorizing withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment under
certain circumstances. As amended in April 1992, the Virginia law pro-
vides: "Nothing in this article shall be construed to require a physician
to prescribe or render medical treatment to a patient that the physician
determines to be medically or ethically inappropriate." 163 The statute
does not define "medically or ethically inappropriate treatment," but it
does state that if a physician's treatment determination is contrary to
that of the patient, "the physician shall make a reasonable effort to trans-
fer the patient to another physician."1 64
Thus, like the abortion refusal statutes, this change in at least one
state's law 65 acknowledges that a physician may object to a patient's
treatment choices purely on ethical grounds and protects the physician in
asserting that objection. In an instance of doctor-patient disagreement,
the patient is likewise protected from abandonment by requiring the phy-
sician to transfer the patient to another qualified doctor. This statutory
acknowledgement of a physician's professional conscience represents an
important step toward providing greater physician autonomy and greater
patient protection. If physicians know they are protected in the choices
162. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to 54.1-2993 (Michie 1992).
163. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990.
164. Id.
165. Legislators in California attempted to institute a similar change in that state's law.
On February 25, 1991, a group of Assembly Members introduced A.B. 705 that would have
extended the law regarding refusal to participate in abortion to any medical procedure. The
bill provided in part: "No employer or other person shall require a physician... to directly
participate in any medical procedure if the [physician] has filed a written statement with the
employer or the hospital, facility or clinic indicating a moral, ethical, or religious basis for
refusal to participate in the medical procedure." The bill was passed by the California Assem-
bly and was referred to the California Senate on June 18, 1991. No further action has been
taken on the bill.
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they make vis-i-vis their patients, they are more likely to be open and
forthcoming with their patients when making those choices. 166
The dilemma of patient transfer remains problematic even in an at-
mosphere of tolerance toward a physician's moral and ethical assertions.
As many cases demonstrate, 67 it is often difficult if not impossible for a
physician to transfer a patient with whom the doctor has clashed over
treatment choices. Since it appears that our jurisprudence, and perhaps
our collective societal conscience, is unwilling to advocate abandonment
of patients who seek medically futile care, our focus should be on how to
best effectuate patient transfer. Our current ad hoc method is not work-
ing. A better approach may be to develop a systematic response to indi-
vidual cases, much like the system used by attorneys who wish to
withdraw from representation of a particular client.
IV. A Systematic Approach to Patient Transfer: Adapting the
American Bar Association's Approach to Lawyer
Withdrawal
A. Standards Governing Lawyer Withdrawal from Client Representation
The relationship between a doctor and a patient is unique, but not
one without some analogy to other professions. Attorneys, like physi-
cians, are trained to advise and serve their clients to the best of their
ability. Lawyers have confidential relationships with clients who look to
their counsel, in many instances, for assistance in confronting major life
events such as divorce, bankruptcy, and even death.1 68 Like physicians,
166. If doctors believe that if they begin a therapy, such as ventilator support on an
acutely ill patients, they will be bound to continue the treatment even if that treatment be-
comes what they consider to be "medically and ethically inappropriate," then doctors are less
likely to offer that therapy in the first instance. Alternatively, if doctors know that after treat-
ment has begun, they have the option of declining to continue providing treatment once they
consider it to be futile, they will be more likely to disclose and apply that treatment option to
patients.
This same argument was recently advanced in an article by Lance Stell, a professor of
philosophy. Professor Stell proposes hospitals adopt institutional standards for withholding or
withdrawing futile treatment, even when the family demands continued care. He suggests
such standards should require prompt, clear communication with the patient or surrogate,
because
[n]ot to do this invites suspicion and cynicism and erodes medical integrity. In the
absence of a standard, physicians who feel compelled to comply with medically un-
justified demands for full measures may practice strategic concealment of their deci-
sions or deliver half-measures in selected cases.
Lance K. Stell, Stopping Treatment on Grounds of Futility: A Role for Institutional Policy, I 1
ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 481, 493 (1992).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 124-131.
168. Lawyers help clients deal with death in a variety of ways, including drafting wills and
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attorneys do not always agree with the course of action clients wish to
take. In these instances, attorneys, like their medical counterparts, face
the dilemma of whether or not to continue representing a client whose
views or requests are in conflict with their professional consciences.
The American Bar Association, which governs the conduct of attor-
neys through its Model Rules of Professional Conduct,1 69 offers guidance
to attorneys who wish to withdraw from representing a client. Model
Rule 1.16 discusses the circumstances under which a lawyer may with-
draw, providing in relevant part:
[A] lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can
be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the
client, or if:
(3) the client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer
considers repugnant or imprudent; [or]
(6) other good cause for withdrawal exists.170
One noteworthy aspect of this rule is that it attempts to balance the
interests of the client and the lawyer. The rule provides that a lawyer
may withdraw from representing a client for any reason at any time so
long as the client's interests are not adversely affected (thus the client is
protected). However, a lawyer may withdraw, even if the client's inter-
ests will be adversely affected, if the lawyer considers the client's objec-
tive repugnant or imprudent, or for other "good cause." Thus, the
lawyer is protected from having to represent a client with whom he or
she fundamentally disagrees.
What this rule arguably represents is acknowledgement of and re-
spect for the lawyer's professional conscience. The ABA seems to under-
stand that in instances when an attorney and client reach an
irreconcilable impasse as to how to proceed, continued representation is
not in the client's or the lawyer's best interest. This sentiment is also
reflected in Model Rule 1.7, pertaining to conflict of interest. This rule
states that "[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of
that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's ...own inter-
trusts, explaining and providing advance directives for health care decision making, and repre-
senting defendants in death penalty cases.
169. The ABA is a private organization that has no power to impose rules on lawyers
directly. Instead, the ABA indirectly regulates the conduct of lawyers through the promulga-
tion of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The Rules were adopted by the ABA House
of Delegates on August 2, 1983, and have since been adopted by 34 states and incorporated
into law in significant portion by six others. See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAW-
YERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHics 3-4 (1992).
170. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b)(3), (6) (1989).
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ests." 71 The Model Rules do not specifically define a lawyer's "own in-
terest," thus allowing for a broad, perhaps individualistic, interpretation
of such an interest.' 72 Allowing a lawyer to decide when his or her inter-
ests conflict with those of the client and to withdraw from representing
that client for "good cause" is a way of permitting a lawyer to act as an
autonomous moral agent in the practice of law.
The ABA has not been the only body to recognize the concept of
lawyer autonomy. In Jones v. Barnes,173 the United States Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether an indigent defendant has a consti-
tutional right to compel appointed counsel to raise any nonfrivolous
point on appeal if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment, decides
not to present those points. Holding that the defendant does not have
such a right, the Court stressed the need for counsel to present the cli-
ent's case "in accord with counsel's professional evaluation." ' 174 The
Court recognized that decisions about legal strategy should include law-
yer and client input, but held that at some point an attorney must be
allowed to exercise his or her professional judgement even if it is contrary
to a client's wishes.' 75
While the Court in Jones did not address the issue of a lawyer's
withdrawal from representing a client, it did take a position on the im-
portance of lawyer autonomy in the attorney-client relationship. The
Court recognized a client "has the ultimate authority to make certain
fundamental decisions regarding the case," but held this right must be
balanced against the attorney's right to exercise "professional judgment"
when proceeding in a manner disfavored by the client.176 This conflict
scenario is not altogether different from that posed by Wanglie and other
cases in which the physician disagrees with "certain fundamental deci-
sions" made by the patient. In both instances the professional is forced
to choose between the wishes of those they are trained to assist and their
171. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1989). The Rule also
states that lawyers may undertake representation in such an instance if they reasonably believe
the representation will not be adversely affected and the client consents after consultation.
172. The comments following Model Rule 1.7 give examples of a lawyer's own interest
that might conflict with those of the client. The comments refer primarily to pecuniary inter-
ests that could conflict with the client's interests, such as referring clients to an enterprise in
which the lawyer has an undisclosed interest. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. (1989).
173. 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
174. Id. at 751.
175. Id.
176. Id. Here the Court was referring to a criminal defendant who was represented by
appointed counsel. The principles announced in the opinion can arguably be extended to ap-
ply to any situation in which a client asks the lawyer to press a claim or strategy the attorney
believes should not be pursued.
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own professional conscience. In both instances lawyers and doctors have
generally been permitted, either through statutes, codes of conduct, or
court decisions, to decline services to those with whom they have
clashed. 177
What is different between the clash experienced by doctors at the
bedside and attorneys in the courtroom is the degree of supervision and
assistance the professional receives when he or she makes the difficult
decision to dismiss a patient or client. By comparing a physician treating
a patient to an attorney representing a client in litigation, one can ob-
serve the different positions each professional finds themselves vis-a-vis
the institutional setting in which they work. For doctors, a decision to
transfer a patient is made in an institutional vacuum; no structure exists
to facilitate or even guide the physician as to how to proceed.17 8 As a
result, in many cases no transfer is effected, or perhaps worse, no transfer
is attempted because the physician fears overwhelming obstacles to its
attainment.
In contrast, when an attorney representing a client before a tribunal
decides to withdraw from that case, the lawyer must petition the court
for permission to withdraw.17 9 This procedure alerts the court that a
177. As noted supra in the text accompanying notes 132-148, doctors are not always per-
mitted to transfer a patient when they disagree with the patient's treatment plan. Attorneys
are likewise bound to continue representing their clients in certain situations. Specifically,
Model Rule 1.6(c) provides: "When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue
representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation." MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c) (1983). When courts are confronted with a
request by an attorney to withdraw from a case that is pending before a tribunal, they must
"'balance the need for the orderly administration ofjustice with the fact that an irreconcilable
conflict exists between counsel and the [client].'" See Boudreau v. Carlisle, 549 So. 2d 1073,
1074 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (denying counsel's motion to withdraw less than one month
before trial was to begin) (citations omitted). Because courts must be concerned with the
orderly administration of justice, in many instances they will order an attorney to continue to
represent a client in an ongoing case unless the court believes "'that the attorney-client rela-
tionship has... deteriorated to a point where counsel can no longer give effective aid in the
fair presentation of a defense.'" Id. at 1075 (citation omitted).
178. For example, in the case of Mrs. Wanglie, Dr. Miles describes, with notable frustra-
tion, the efforts the medical center undertook to deal with the clash between the family and the
treating physicians:
The medical staff had exhausted every means possible to address the dispute and
avoid court, including: counseling, offering to transfer the patient to other providers,
and providing months of inappropriate intensive care so that the family could come
to terms with the irreversibility of the patient's condition.
Miles, Interpersonal Issues, supra note 68, at 63. This story indicates the medical center had no
formal mechanism in place to address the clash that arose.
179. The rules governing attorney withdrawal and substitution of counsel are contained in
local court rules. For example, Local Rule 2.8.2.1 of the United States District Court for the
Central District of California, entitled Substitution of Attorney, provides as follows:
Motion for Withdrawal. An attorney may not withdraw as counsel except by leave
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problem has developed in the attorney-client relationship. The court is
forced to learn about the conflict and make a decision about whether the
client will be better served by continued representation or by a new law-
yer who must become familiar with the case in a short period of time.
Bringing the court into the conflict allows for an independent assessment
of the needs and interests of both lawyer and client.
While attorney withdrawal is never easy for the client who must
secure other counsel, 180 at least it can be accomplished in a routine, pre-
dictable, institutionalized setting. Establishing a more routine, system-
atic method of accomplishing physician withdrawal should provide
doctors with greater opportunity to exercise their professional con-
science. If physicians had access to a system that allowed them to air
their views about a patient's treatment preferences, the overall doctor-
patient relationship could be improved by enhanced communication and
external support.
B. Establishing In-Hospital and Local Boards to Facilitate Patient Transfer
Hospitals, like courts, are institutions with the capacity to inaugu-
rate reform that will enhance the institutional environment. As sug-
gested above, one such reform should be to institute a formal mechanism
for hearing and responding to fundamental disagreements between pa-
tients and physicians over the course of treatment.' 8' Arguably such a
of court. An application for leave to withdraw must be made upon written notice
given reasonably in advance to the client and to all other parties who have appeared
in the action.
The rules also address the situations under which a court may deny an attorney's motion for
withdrawal. Local Rule 2.8.2.4 provides: "Unless good cause is shown and the ends of justice
require, no substitution or relief of attorney will be approved that will cause delay in prosecu-
tion of the case to completion." C.D. CAL. R. 2.8.2.4.
180. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct address the responsibilities of an attorney
who has withdrawn from representing a client. Model Rule 1.16(d) provides:
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably
practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the cli-
ent, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and prop-
erty to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has
not been earned.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(d) (1983). This rule does not require
an attorney to assist the client in securing another lawyer. In this sense, the rule resembles the
common law governing physician abandonment of a patient, which likewise does not require a
doctor to assist a patient in locating another physician if the patient is medically stable. See
supra text accompanying notes 99-110. If a patient is not medically stable, a court will often
instruct the withdrawing physician to assist in transferring the patient to another physician.
See supra text accompanying notes 112-119.
181. It seems practical to limit the jurisdiction of such a group, as defined infra in the text
accompanying notes 183-185, to "fundamental disagreements." Frivolous, day-to-day con-
flicts should not be heard by this forum. Instead, the forum should be designed to resolve
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mechanism already exists in most hospitals in the form of ethics commit-
tees. However, as recent literature suggests, institutional bioethics com-
mittees are not uniform in composition, mission, or authority.1 82
Moreover, the type of committee contemplated herein would be more
specialized and better equipped to respond quickly to physicians who
find themselves facing a dilemma of conscience.
In order to provide a forum for physicians to exercise their profes-
sional conscience, hospitals should create treatment evaluation boards
(TEBs). The purpose of these boards should be threefold: First, to cre-
ate a forum for physicians to discuss specific disagreements with the
course of treatment their patients have requested. Second, to deliberate
as to how to meet the needs of the patient and the physician under the
circumstances. 183 Third, to facilitate, if necessary, the transfer of the pa-
tient either to another physician in the same hospital or to another facil-
ity. This third function stands out as the most important role of the TEB
because it removes the burden of transfer from patients and physicians
and places it on the institution.1 84
Ideally, a TEB should be composed of two members from the full-
time medical staff, one member who represents the hospital administra-
tion (this member should serve as chair of the board), and one member
disputes that are central to the patient's course of treatment. Such disagreements would in-
clude decisions as to whether to resuscitate a patient following cardiopulmonary arrest,
whether to ventilate a patient in a persistent vegetative state, and decisions about the adminis-
tration of chemotherapy or other drugs to hopelessly ill patients.
182. See, eg., Jonathan D. Moreno, Institutional Ethics Committees: Proceed With Cau-
tion, 50 MD. L. REv. 895 (1991); Susan M. Wolf, Ethics Committees and Due Process: Nesting
Rights in a Community of Caring, 50 MD. L. Rnv. 798 (1991).
183. This second purpose, as phrased herein, is intentionally vague and optimistic in that it
assumes that some resolution can be reached. In many cases resolution will not be easily
achieved, if it can be achieved at all. For example, the family of a patient in a persistent
vegetative state may demand continued aggressive care in the form of code-blue status, ventila-
tor support, and artificial administration of food and fluids. The physician may believe "com-
fort care" such as hydration and pain relief is the only reasonable course of treatment. That
same family might demand that the treating physician remain on the case because the family
has grown to trust that doctor, in spite of their fundamental disagreement with the physician's
recommendations. For this case and others like it, hospitals may want to enact more specific
guidelines as to the resolution of disputes between doctors and patients. For example, hospi-
tals could adopt policies that disclose to the patient that they will not offer treatment they
consider medically futile. See Stell, supra note 166 (proposing a model hospital policy for
withholding and withdrawing treatment on grounds of medical futility). Or hospitals may
want to make a general statement that they will not compel a physician to act against his or
her moral, ethical, or religious beliefs. See Edmund G. Howe, Caveats Regarding Slippery
Slopes and Physicians' Moral Conscience, 3 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 251 (1992).
184. Patient transfer cannot and should not be achieved without some involvement of the
patient and the physician. However, since hospitals have better resources to facilitate patient
transfer, the bulk of responsibility should be shifted to the hospital.
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who is a hospital social worker. This composition provides representa-
tion from the hospital departments most affected by a clash at the bed-
side. This four-member team should be appointed for a term of at least
two years, with new appointments to occur on a rotating basis to ensure
continuity of knowledge and experience. In addition, for each case
presented to the board, the chair should appoint one member of the med-
ical staff who has expertise in the particular disease or injury from which
the patient suffers. The four-member TEB should meet initially to set up
procedures for hearing and handling disputes. Thereafter, the full board
should meet only when called upon by a physician. 185
The notion of a hospital board constituted to resolve individual pa-
tient problems is not novel. Many hospitals have created "prognosis
boards," comprised of physicians who are asked to review an attending
physician's diagnosis of permanent unconsciousness for purposes of with-
drawing treatment.18 6 The purpose of the prognosis board is to ensure
the hospital has made an independent evaluation of the patient's condi-
tion before authorizing withdrawal of treatment. Similarly, TEBs would
insure an independent assessment of the situation by those who are
knowledgeable about the medical crisis at issue. Additionally, these
boards would serve the unique purpose of resolving individual physician
dilemmas as they relate to patient care.
The institutional usefulness and benefit of the TEBs could be en-
hanced by modeling these boards in part after judicial tribunals that ad-
judicate criminal cases involving indigent defendants. Specifically, the
aspect of the legal system that should be adapted to meet the needs of a
physician and patient at odds over medical treatment is the procedure for
appointment of counsel in criminal cases. When the law dictates, courts
are required to adopt procedures for appointment of counsel in criminal
cases for indigent defendants.187 These procedures are used internally by
185. In general, the TEB as proposed herein could not be accessed unilaterally by the
patient. Instead, the patient would have to access the board through his or her physician
(provided the doctor agrees to invoke the board). The reason for this dichotomy is that in
general it is far easier for a patient to dismiss a physician than it is for a doctor to dismiss a
patient. It is a problem for patients, however, to find another physician to take over their care.
For this reason, the TEB bylaws should include some mechanism for patients to unilaterally
access the board when they are seeking a substitute physician.
186. See Persistent Vegetative State, supra note 120, at 429.
187. The constitutional provision guaranteeing criminal defendants access to counsel is the
Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which provides in relevant part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the assistance of counsel for his
defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. While a full discussion of the constitutional basis for the
right to counsel in criminal cases is beyond the scope of this Article, the procedures courts
have adopted to assure defendants adequate representation are worth examining for possible
adaptation in the medical setting.
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the court to ensure that each accused is adequately represented in the
criminal justice system.
For example, California Rule of Court 76.5 outlines the procedures
California Courts of Appeal are to follow when providing representation
for indigent appellants. The rule states: "The procedures shall require
each attorney to complete a questionnaire showing the date of admission
to the bar and the attorney's qualifications and experience." 188 Once the
court receives the completed questionnaire, the court is directed to "eval-
uate the attorney's qualifications to represent appellants in criminal
cases, and then place the attorney's name on one or more lists to receive
appointments to cases for which he or she is qualified." 189 By keeping
and maintaining190 these lists, courts work to provide continual access to
representation for those clients they oversee.
Hospitals should look to this judicial model when setting up treat-
ment evaluation boards. The TEB should be charged with adopting pro-
cedures for the appointment of an alternative physician when the treating
physician requests the patient be transferred from his or her care. The
boards could require all physicians who are members of the medical staff
to complete a questionnaire disclosing their area of practice, their years
of experience, and their interest in having their name placed on a list of
doctors willing to accept patients transferred from other physicians.19 1
The questionnaire would have to be designed to elicit information about
the doctor's professional conscience: what goals does the physician have
for terminally-ill patients; how comfortable does the physician feel ren-
dering treatment that provides no objective medical benefit; is the physi-
cian willing to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment and if so,
under what circumstances. Granted, the complete accuracy of a ques-
tionnaire in reflecting this personal information could be questioned, but
at least the TEB would have some basic information about the pool of
physicians from which it could select a substitute caretaker.
There may be instances in which the TEB would be unable to locate
a substitute physician on the medical staff of the treating hospital.192 In
188. CAL. R. CT. 76.5(a).
189. CAL. R. Cr. 76.5(b).
190. The courts are required to review and evaluate the performance of appointed counsel
to determine whether the attorney's name should remain on the appointment list, be placed on
a different list, or be deleted. CAL. R. Cr. 76.5(c).
191. Alternatively, this information could be solicited from physicians when they apply for
medical staff privileges at an institution.
192. Ideally, the TEB should strive to locate an alternate physician from the same institu-
tion to minimize the time for transfer as well as the inconvenience to the patient and family.
There may be instances when the patient wishes to be transferred outside the institution, and
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those instances, the TEB should search for an alternate physician at a
different institution. To facilitate this search, each hospital TEB should
submit to the local medical association its list of physicians willing to
accept transfer patients. The medical association should act as a
clearinghouse for the master list of possible appointees, thus facilitating
transfer from one institution to another. With a centralized record
keeper, information that is currently obtained only through individual,
ad hoc searches could be made readily available as the need for such
important information arises.
In sum, a system that gives physicians the opportunity to voice their
professional conscience would create a better environment for doctors
and patients alike. Treating doctors who clash with their patients similar
to lawyers who seek to dismiss their clients means creating an overseeing
body that can independently assess the needs of the patient as well as the
physician. A hospital-based committee, such as the TEBs suggested
herein, could serve as this overseer by hearing fundamental disputes be-
tween doctors and patients and making decisions about the future of
those relationships. Moreover, equipping TEBs with the ability to assist
in transferring a patient when necessary would drastically reduce the
stress felt by doctors, patients, and their families when they fundamen-
tally disagree about the course of treatment.
V. Conclusion
The plight of Helga Wanglie, a woman whose family tested the lim-
its of medically appropriate treatment, brought attention to an issue that
has been in the background of bioethical jurisprudence for many years.
Wanglie focused attention on the issue of physician autonomy in the con-
text of patient decision making. That case challenged the court, as well
as our society, to consider whether a physician has an obligation to pro-
vide medical treatment he or she believes is inappropriate. While the
Wanglie court may have successfully sidestepped that particular issue, it
was unable to quell the mounting concern over a physician's ability to
exercise his or her professional conscience in the clinical setting.
The concept of a physician's professional conscience will become in-
creasingly relevant as the cost of health care rises to the point where our
demands for care greatly outweigh our ability to pay for such care. As
cost becomes an increasingly important factor in the way medicine is
practiced, patients may be forced to rely more on their physician's judg-
to the extent the TEB is involved in that transfer, every effort should be made to accommodate
that patient.
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ment as to what treatment is medically appropriate. 193 To downplay the
role a physician's professional conscience plays in medical decision mak-
ing, as both courts and policy makers traditionally have done, does not
advance patient autonomy; instead, it causes doctors to be more con-
servative and withholding in the range of options they offer their
patients.
If patient autonomy is to have meaning, recognition must also be
given to a physician's moral autonomy. This Article suggests that when
patients clash with their physicians over treatment choices, the principle
of patient autonomy does not automatically require that the physician be
forced to comply. Providing doctors with a forum in which to express
their concerns and with the ability to transfer patients when necessary
would enable physicians to practice medicine in a way that comports
with their professional conscience. The exercise of a physician's profes-
sional conscience could go a long way toward resolving the clash at the
bedside.
193. In our current health care system, physicians, as well as administrators and insurers,
are already well accustomed to making decisions about the reasonableness and appropriateness
of medical treatment with respect to cost. This Article has intentionally focused on issues
outside of the economics of health care delivery. However, as our nation grows increasingly
unable to provide economical care to its citizens, judgments about medical appropriateness will
be linked directly to the cost of treatment.
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